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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Research Question 
The past twenty years have produced a wealth ot 
research examining user responses to accounting data. Gen-
erally, such studies have taken one of two tactics. These 
two research avenues can be thought of as endpoints on a 
continuum of accounting data user aggregation. On the one 
end are studies examining individual user reactions to 
accounting variables, with tne opposite end comprising 
research investigating aggregate market reactions tc 
accounting data (generally, the broad class of capital rrar-
ket impact studies). Although both these endpoints have 
been examined intensively, there apQears to be a lack of 
research pursuit between tne endpoint aggregation levels. 
As such, a study examining group responses to accounting 
data should be of interest. Specifically, the proposed 
research will address the general issue of whether groups 
are more sophisticated in the use of accounting data than 
are individuals. 
1 
2 
Justification of the Research ~uestion 
Since this research study intends to explicate the rel-
attonship betwee~ groups and individuals in their use of 
accounting data, it becomes desirable to delineate the 
rationale behind a study of groups. first, the use of 
accounting data by groups is interesting in and cf itself. 
There are many decisions made at a group level of aggrega-
tion that have yet to be submitted to empirical investiga-
tion. Examples abound, Including capital budgeting deci-
sions, pricing decisions, performance evaluations, loan 
decisions, and decisions regarding audit opinions. Many of 
these decisions have been investigated at the individual 
decision maker level; however, it is questionable whether 
this is the proper reode of investigation given that these 
decisions are rarely made by individuals. 1 There is arnvle 
evidence (see Kelley and Thibaut £3SJ for a reviek) indicat-
ing that the behavior of groups is vastly different than 
that of individual5. Likewise, ir a risk taking environment 
Libby and Fishburn's (43) review indicated that individual 
and group risk taking models will differ due to aggregate 
phenomena. This is, of course, relevant to accourting pol-
icy decisions because the information processing character-
istics of groups may be entirely different than the informa-
tion processing characteristics ot lndiviouals. 
--~----~~----~-----
~Studies on individual decisior. making ir.clude decis1or: 
contexts as reateriality decisions (11}, aucitor decisions 
(6) (37), loan decisions {42), and pricing decisions (5). 
3 
However, one group level of aggre':}ation, specifically 
capital market behavior, has been submitted to considerable 
empirical investigation. One of the results derived from 
these studies is the apparent efficiency cf the captial mar-
kets (at least in the semi-strong fer~ C29l). Capital mar-
ket efficiency suggests that stock prices reflect currently 
available information, which furth€r implies that the capi-
tal market is sophisticated in the use of accounting data 
(.31). These c cnclus ions are diametric ally opposed to the 
conclusions cf individual behavioral research. Individuals 
have been found to be far from sophisticated in their use of 
accounting data. Unsophisticateci cata use has beEn identi-
fied in the psychological literature as infonnation overload 
effects (50), rtsk preference reversals (55), functional 
fixation (20), primacy and recency effects (51), and con-
servative probability revision relative to Bcye•s Rule 
( 26). 
A summary of the above results suggest the aggregate 
market is sophisticated in its use cf accounting data, while 
individuals may be bounded in their optimal data use. 
Therefore, an investigation of some m1ddle ground is sug-
gested. The second rationale behind this study becomes 
apparent-to provide a bridge or possibly an explanation of 
these contrasting conclus~ons. I.r ether ~ords, the research 
question is, does a small aggregation of users experience 
the same difficulties as do Individuals, or do they approach 
the sophistication of the capital markets in data use? 2 
4 
A third rationale behind the investigation of group 
decision making processing is closely related to the previ-
ous discussion. Beaver {10) provided convincing arguments 
for the abandon~ent of extant FASB policy objectives, nased 
on capital market evidence. Beaver concluded that many of 
the debated reporting issues become trivial if there are no 
cost differences between reporting alternatives 1 and it 
there is no user cost to convert from one reporting method 
to another. As a result, disclosure becomes the paramount 
issue. The report of an economic event under one accounting 
alternative, and disclosure of enough information to convert 
to any other, are sufficient conditions to allo~ marKet 
efficiency in the use of such data. This implies that 
reporting issues such as investment credit, interperiod ta~ 
allocation, full cost versus successful efforts, EPS compu-
tations, and capitalization of interest costs are trivial 
issues, given footnote disclosure. The question then 
arises, why are such issues still controversial, particu-
.larly among practitioners? One ans~er rnay be that these 
types of questions are important in settings other than at 
the market level. There are different markets and different 
aggregation levels in economic decision waking besides the 
long-term equity markets. As indicated earlier, there exist 
information markets and group level decision rraking for such 
-----~--~---~-------
2 The usefulness of such a study is also espoused by 
Einhorn (21, p. 1Y8}. 
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decisions as product pricing, loan granting, cap 1 tal 
budgeting, and bond pricing. It is possible that present 
policy objectives of the FAS8 and SEC, which do not appear 
to be those suggested by Beaver, are relevant to the demands 
of such markets. 
The present study will atteffpt to bridge the findings 
of the experimental literature on individual decision making 
with the empirical results of the capital market literatuce 
with respect to user processing sophistication~ With Rea-
ver•s thoughts in mind, sophistication will be narrowly 
defined as the user•s ability to perceive the economic 
equality between hypothetical tirms, given different long-
term liability disclosures. Or alternatively the question 
becomes, do users arranged as either individuals or groups 
distinguish between identical firms depencing upon whether a 
liability is recorded on the face o1 the balance sheet or as 
an appended footnote? 
The basic question was answer~d by testing two 
hypotheses on the r1sk perceptions of cou:-nerciJl loan ofti-
cers. For the individual and group phase of the experiment 
the null hypothesis can be stated as follows: 
Ho(l): the risk perceptions of an individual or 
group over simultaneous evaluations of t~o icentl-
cal firms will be equal despite different liaotl-
ity disclosures. 
If the subjects are efficient information processors~ one 
would expect the null hypothesis not to be reJected. The 
6 
presence of significant effects ~auld suggest t~at the 
subjects are unable to equate statement versus footnote 
presentation of an economic event as 1t bears upon risk per-
ceptions. Based on prior evidence and a pilot study (Appen-
dix C), a priori one ~ould expect Ho(l) to be rejected in 
the individual phase and not to be rejected in the grou~ 
phase. 
After the indlv idual and group phase were analyzed sep-
arately the results were coRpared. A priori, one "'ould 
expect more processing inefficiencies in the individuals 
than in the groups. Therefore, the second hypothesis to be 
tested can be stated in the tJuil torm as follows: 
Ho{2): Groups and individuals will exhibit an 
equal degree of processing efficiency (or ineffi-
ciency). 
alternatively, 
Ha (2): individuals will exhibit a greater degree 
of processing inefficient than will groups. 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEw 
Closel~ related to the present research ts the Lroad 
array of studies examining user reactions to accounting pro-
cedure changes that alter accounting numbers, but not the 
underlYing economic structure of the firrn.1 Such studies 
can be easily dichotomized into the individual us~r and 
aggregate warket type research. 
Individual Decision Makers 
Among the individual user research in this area, the 
early work consists of studies by Bruns (12) and Uyckrnan 
(21) (22). Bruns investigated whether students wculd evalu-
ate simulated firm data prepared under LIFO versus FIFO cost 
flow assumptions (suppressing tax effects) d i f i e r<! n t l y or. 
several managerial tasks; such as production, a~vertis1ng 
expenditure, and pricing decisions. Results indicated that 
the students• decisions were unaffected by the reportlng 
differences. 
--------------------
1Many of these studies hypothesize the existence of 
user nfunctional fixation" on accour,ting variables; 1 .. e. the 
inability ot users to see through ceport1ng chftHences to 
any substcntive economic differences in the fin:;., See 
lj1r1, Jaedicke, and Knight (35) tor an explanation ot tu~c­
tional. fixation as related to accounting Lurrbers. 
'1 
8 
In a similar study Dyckman (22) .solicited intermediate 
accountin~ students to evaluate two report sets, one con-
structed under a FIFO inventory cast flow assumption and the 
other under a LIFO assumption. These report set evaluations 
were separated by a 2 1/2 month span. As in Drun•s study 
the dependent variables were several manayerial decisions 
including unit production, R and D expenditure, market1n9 
expenditure, unit price, and dividend declaration evalua-
tions. Dyckman i nv es ti gated for effects en three treatment 
variables: firm size, earnings trend, and inventory cost 
flow assumption. The results supported Bruns in exhibiting 
no subject response variability due to the invertory cost 
flow assumption (except on the advertising variable). 
Dyckman (21) continued his examination Gf subject 
responses to accounting number chan~es by altering the expe-
rimental task. Again, students were used as surrcgates for 
statement users. However, instead of managerial decisions, 
this study emphasized reporting change effects on the 
investment decision. ls in the previous studies the FIFO 
versus LIFO reporting change, exclusive of tax effects, was 
used as tne treatment variable. The dependent variable was 
the assignment of a ~arket Price fer share for the given 
security. Even though reconciliny information between 
report sets were given, the students evaluated thE: ftrms 
differently. Dyckman concluded that the "average inve~tor" 
may be unable to differentiate between accounting changes 
9 
and economic charges in the consideration of equity invest-
ments. 
Jensen (36) modified upon past efforts by employing a 
2x2x2x2 completely randomized factorial experiment on 
sophisticated subjects. The experiment consisted cf pres-
enting financial analysts with the financial stateffents of 
two different companies. The financial statements consisted 
of either a FIFO or LIFO inventory valuation ard either 
straight line or accelerated depreciation. Within.a single 
company all information remained the same except for the 
inventory and depreciation accountinq methods {again ta~ 
effects were excluded). The financial analysts ~ere asked 
to allocate a percentage of fixed available funds to each 
company and to deterwine a price ~er share for each company. 
On each of these dependent variables an ANOVA prccedure was 
utilized. Results indicated significant ~ain effects on tne 
four treatment conditions tor both dependent variables on 
each company. The depreciation and inventory reporting 
methods s1gn1fic2ntly influenced the analysts•s evaluations 
of the two companies. 
Dyckman (23) expanded upon his earlier wcrk by broaden-
ing his s~bject participation and exa~ining additional 
effects. Students and middle management businessmen were 
asked to evaluate two simulated firms whose only differences 
were inventory policy (FIFO versus LIFO), and an arbitrary 
size factor adjustment. The inventory policy ca~ses rela-
10 
tlve differences between the two report sets, while the size 
factor only produces an absolute difference in the report 
set numbers. The evaluations between firms were rnade under 
three earnings trend conditions: increasing, decreasing, 
and constant. The lone dependent variable in this stucty was 
the subject assignment of a dollar value to the two purchase 
opportunities (firms). Dyckman cor.cluded that there was nc 
size effect on the dependent variable, but there was a 
simultaneous effect from earnings trend and inventory pol-
icy. Again, Dyckman supported i~dtvidual inefflcie~cies in 
processing accounting data. 
Dyckman (24) continued his interest in this area by 
completing aAR !l· Dyckman artificially construct~d twc 
firms whose income differences would switch signs depending 
if the two income numbers were constructed under conven-
tiona! or price adjusted formats.a Investrrent anzJysts ~ere 
given prospectuses of the two firms under the following 
re~ort set conditions: conventional reports, conventional 
reports with supplementary price adjusted statements, and 
price adjusted reports. Each ar:alyst was assigned one of 
these report sets, after which the analyst selected the tirrr 
perceived to have a higher price offering and the price 
range within which the equity offer should be made. One 
.... -----·-------------
1 Thts was accomplished by constructing essentially 
identical firms except for the fixed asset age at the aeci-
sion point in time. 
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would expect that in the presence of accurate human informa-
tion processing there would be a difference perceived 
bet~een the two firms, because of the asset age. However, 
this difference would be homogeneous across the rEport sets 
irregardless of the unique income evaluations for the two 
firms within the report sets. Contrary to this expectation, 
Dyckman discovered nonhomogeneous differences across the 
report sets, indicating possible subject fixation upon the 
income numbers. 
Barrett (8) concluded from his review of the literature 
that previous studies failed on two points. They falled to 
utilize subjects sufficiently sophisticated for the given 
tasks, and they failed to provide the subjects sufficient 
reconciling information within the task. As a result, Bar-
rett found conclusions supporting differential effects due 
to accounting nurnoer changes premature. Barrett constructed 
two hypothetical oil companies wbose prospectuses were sent 
to fina~ial analysts, including specialists ir the oil 
industry (48%). E~perimental classes were designed to 
abstract any effects due to accounting policy changes and 
effects due to the amount of footnote reconciling informa-
tion. The two reporting alternatives utilized in the study 
were the cost and equity method of recording intercorporate 
investments. The oil industry experts were asked to provide 
a price per share evaluation. Tbe results on these depend-
ent variables indicated a significant information effect 
12 
(disclosure effect), but an insignificant effect on the 
equity versus cost reports at a high information level. 
This conclusion is, of course, opposite to many of the pre-
vious studies in th1s area. 
A classroom experiment by Dopuch and Ronen (19} again 
invEstigated the LIFO versus FIFO controversy, but with the 
inclusion of tax effects (real effects). Their experiment 
consisted ot subject evaluation of two actual retail firms 
with each firm alternatively employing FIFO or LIFO. THis 
resulted in four treatment combinations of FIFO vs. LIFO 
fir.rns. Subjects were asked to allocate fixed available 
funds between the two firms in all four treatment classes. 
Optimal behavior ~ould have resulted in roore capital alloca-
tion to the LIFO report of a firm than to the FIFO report, 
holding the other firm report fixed at either FIFO or LIFO.• 
There yas partial support of this optimal expectation in 
that 54% of the responses indicated no effects and 23% inci-
dated LIFO effects in their fund allocations' over two com-
parisons. Dopuch and Ronen inflated the FIFO versus LIFO 
income differences by 10% and 151. This manipulation had 
pronounced effects on the subjects• allocations. FIFO 
effects increased to 33% and 511 ot the total resporses tor 
the 10% and 15% conditions respectively. 
~----------------~--
3Th1s is, of course, true because of the real tax bene-
fit LIFO reporting will afford over FIFO reporting. 
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Mcintyre (45) obtained student resporses to historical 
cost versus reconstructed current cost statements of actual 
firms. The students were asked to price the stock and 
choose which of two companies would have a maximal rate of 
return. Mcintyre found no disparity between the subject 
responses for the two reporting methods. However, as Mcln-
tyre suggests, the absence of an effect may be due to a 
"shcck effect0 of the unfaro111ar current cost statements. 
It is entirely possible the students ignored the current 
cost statements and relied upon the more familiar in making 
evaluations. 
The above studies have mostly examined accounting 
reporting alternatives (LIFO versus FIFO, cost versus equity 
method, conventional versus GPL restate~ent, etcetera) and 
their effects upon subject decision variables. Ortman (48) 
follows a similar approach, 
change envolving segment data 
but instead examines a format 
disclosure. The presence or 
absence of segment data 
than it is of alternative 
is more a question of cisclosure 
accounting procedures that commu-
nicate the same economic event. Catadian financial analysts 
were arranged in a control group design, and were reyuested 
to estimate a price per share for two firms access two 
industries. One set of the two tirms included segmenteri 
data while the control set did not include segme~ted data. 
Fro~ the associated financial ratios the analysts rrade their 
evaluations. The results indica ted that the expe rimen ta 1 
14 
group (with segmented data) had a lower response variance 
(i.e. higher consensus), than did the control group (without 
segmented data). The presence of segmented data had an 
effect on subject responses. 
All of the previous studies nave examined individual 
data processing ability pursuant to methodological changes 
in calculating data input (e.g. FIFO versus LIFO). Chang 
and Birnbe r g · ( 13) !den tified a different type of setting 
where subjects do not face a change in method1 but a change 
in calculation. Specifically, ~BA students were asked to 
make probability estimates of process control under a change 
in cost standard. The change was announced to the subjects 
in the form ot a correction tc a previously inaccurate 
standard. Processing fixity would predict no charge in the 
probability estimates provided by the students before and 
after the announcement. The results indicated a sigrificant 
response shift after the announcement, thereby opposing a 
processing fixity argument. In addition, the after-an-
·nouncement responses were compared to an unaffected control 
group. Surprisingly, the mean responses between tne after-
announcement control and exper1mer.tal groups were dlffer-
ent1 indicating an unexplained inefficiency res~lting fro~ 
the announcement. 
A convincing study by Abdel-khalik and Keller (l) pro-
vided strong evidence supporting individual subject 1neffi-
ciencies in processing accounting data. In a controlled 
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experiment 61 sophisticated users were requested to rank six 
stocks in descending order of anticipated return, allocate a 
fixed sum among the six stocks, and make predictions of 
expected selling price at three liklihoods (optimistic, most 
likely, and pessimistic). In a design constructed for 
within subject and within firm control the subjects provided 
responses for a LIFO versus FIFO accounting change setting. 
After using parametric and nonparametric analyses the 
authors concluded, 
participants in the sample were greatly influenced 
by reported earnings and negatively influenced by 
the impact of the switch to LIFO on reported earn-
ings even when they were told and were shown tne 
postive impact of the switch decision on net cash 
inflows. To this end, the resluts show that par-
ticipants appear to be functionally fixated on 
using reported earnings to form expectations, even 
if such reported numbers are artificially 
depressed in a significant way (p.47}. 
Individual Processing Summary 
A summary of the above review is offered in Table I 
(Appendix 0). 4 It is apparent that the conclusions to be 
drawn would have to be qualified in the face of such mixed 
results. There is, however, evidence of individual subject 
inaccuracy in the evaluation of alternative accounting pro-
cedure. Unfortunately, it is difficult to make generalized 
•other studies addressing this question .include Living-
stone (44), Mlynarczyk (46), Gonedes (32), Summers (52), 
Elias (28), and Ashton (5). 
statements as 
experimentally. 
16 
to when such a result could be a~ticlpated 
The differential Effect does not appear to 
be systematic with subject type, accounting proceaure treat-
ments1 or dependent variables. The only evident ccnsisLency 
appears in the early Bruns (12) and Dyckean (22) studies. 
Both studies utilized similar subjects1 task environments, 
and dependent variables, resulting in identical conclusions. 
Probably the strongest disconfirmation of any alleged 
individual processing limitatio~s would be the Barrett 
study. Utilizing sophisticated subjects he furnished evi-
dence supporting no differential effects, provided there 
e~isted enough reconciling information. However, this study 
is not generalizable to all accounting procedure alterna-
tives, because the two Dyckman studies (21) (23) and the 
Abdel-khaltk and Keller study (1) provided FIFO/LIFO recon-
ciling informaticn, and still fcund differential sucject 
responses. It is possible that tte Barrett prospectuses and 
10 Year supplemental research reports for bath oil companies 
·were so complex that it was 1mposs1ble for the subjects to 
glean the one piece of information relevant to this study. 
II this was indeed the case, then tests across experimental 
classes maY very well show statistically insignificant dif-
ferences. Also, the prospectuses uere constructed to pro-
vide tor a lOt income difference bet~cen the cost and equity 
method reports. This difference nay not have been large 
enough to allow differential responses. In the Dopuch and 
---------
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Ronen (19J study a 10% income etfect was just beginning to 
cause unegual responses. Clearly, the debate questioning 
individual statement user ability to distinguish accounting 
variable changes from real economic changes still remains 
unresolved. 
Aggregate Users in the Capital Markets 
The efficiency of the capital markets in assessing 
accounting changes was challenged in the early 1910•s, but 
has now reached a point of general acceptability after the 
suPPortive conclusions of numerous capital market impact 
studies. 
Two early studies by Archibald {4) and ~aplan and Roll 
(38) were somewhat disturbing in light ot the evidence sup-
porting capital market efficiency. Archibald, in examining 
depreciation switchbacks, used the market model ~aith a con-
stant risk (Beta) assumption to assess aarket price reac-
tions to the accounting change. Archibald discovered that 
the average aonormal returns were negative before the 
accounting change and positive for approximately 24 months 
thereafter. This systematic effect was unexpected in light 
of capital market efficiency, because the accounting change 
should not have caused a ~arket reaction. Likewise, Kaplan 
and Roll (38) found short run market inefficiencies tor 
depreciation changes (accelerated to straight line) and for 
investment credit changes (det•rral to flowthrough). Again, 
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Kaplan and Roll used the market model with a staticnary Beta 
assumption in isolating the abnormal return. 
Ball (1) was critical of the nethodologies e~ployed b) 
the studies above, and provided strong arguments for an 
alternative approach. Instead of utilizing a constant risk 
market model to remove market w1de variation, Ball employed 
a variable risk cross-sectional model. In analyzing market 
reactlons to six different accounting changes Ball discov-
ered small average errors across firms at the information 
release point and a weak market behavior pattern over time. 
Therefore, Ball concluoed that aarket adjustment~ were not 
associated with accounting changes. 
Further evidence of market efficiencies in light ot 
accounting changes was provided by Sunder (53) (54). Sunder 
(53) examined aver age abnormal returns across firms that 
switched inventory valuation methods from FifO to LIFO. In 
real terms such a change would be beneficial to the firm 
because of a reduced tax liability, even though the actual 
reported income number would be less than under FIFO (for 
most industries). In the absence of concomitant irforrnation 
signals emanating from a change from FIFO to LIFO, other 
than the tax effect, one would e~pect no negative market 
reaction to the decreased income number and possibly a posi-
tive market effect. Indeed, such a positive price effect 
was discovered by Sunder tor those firms that switched from 
FIFO to LIFO. Sunder (54) r~plicated his original study 
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with a variable risk model, and observed results consistent 
with his previous conclusions. 
Differential market reactions were discovered by Harri-
son (33) when accounting chanqes ~ere grouped into discre-
tionary and nondiscretionary changes. Such a result was not 
to say that the market was inefficient in respcnding to 
accounting changes. On the contrary, the discretion-
aryJnondiscretionary information datum was evidertly per-
ceived as important to the market, hence the differential 
market reaction between the two groups of firms. Market 
reaction to such an intervening variable ~ould still support 
market efficiency. 
The reaction of the aggregate capital markets to 
accounting alternatives is evidently consistent ~lth the 
efficient ~arket hypothesis.• The aggregate equity market is 
not fooled by accounting number changes. Such a strong 
affirmation as to the rationality of the aggregate cznnot be 
made for individuals. Given these empirical results, a 
study of small group reactions to accounting alternatives is 
of interest. In particular, do the inefficiencies of indi-
vi duals dissipate when dec is ions using accounting variables 
are made in small groups? 
---~----------------
~Other capital «arket impact studies supporting market 
efficiertcies 1nclude Patz and Boatsman (49), Ab~el-khalik 
and McKeown {2), Dyckman and Smitn (25), Collins and Dent 
(15), and Hong, ~andelker, and Kaflan (34). 
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
Subjects and Lending Environment 
The subjects chosen for this study were bank loan offi-
cers. The data was collected in a field setting at the sub-
. ject•s place of employment. Before collecting the field 
data, the reseai"cller first intervie•ed many lending officers 
and senior personnel within the banking cowmun1ty. The 
interviews revealed a high degree of similarity between the 
large banks (o~er 1 billion in assets) in lending and per-
sonnel policies. 
Generally, lo3n applications are initiated at the indi-
vidual loan officer level. The loan officer has the dual 
function of genorating loan business and screening unwanted 
business. In conducting these functions, the loan officer 
will review an2 analyze a loan a~plic~tion. The result of 
his personnl roview will be a ~ritten report indicating his 
reccumendatlon tor acceptance or rejection. Ecch officer 
operates within a loan authority. this authority allows him 
to make acceptance aDd pricing decisions, without consulta-
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tion, up to a specified loan limit. !his limit is based 
upon rank and experience. Loan applications that require 
funds above the officer•s authority require either the 
approval of a senior officer whose lending authority covers 
the funding needs or the approval of a loan committee. Gen-
erally, there are several committees available to accomodate 
different sized loans. !he size of the committ~es can range 
from two to six or more indiviauals with the initiating 
officer reserved m~mbership. A~plications that require a 
committee approval undergo a formal credit an~lysis, usually 
performed by individuals in a service department. The 
credit analysis involves trend, ratio, cash flow, and quali-
tative analyses from public and private data. the credit 
analysts also includes a recommendation tor coma1ttee con-
sideration. The committee then votes on the loan disposi-
tion as well as determining the interest rate, and other 
terms. 
Within the large banks, the loan officers are highly 
trained degreed personnel. In many instances the officers 
possess a Master of Business Administration degree. Besides 
formal education, loan officers undergo specialized "in 
house" training. Included in this tra1nlng are ccurses and 
cases designed to develop the officers• statement analysis 
skills. After this period of training the loan officers 
22 
begin to apply their skills in the credit analysis area. 
The service depart.IIent doubles as a training ground for 
potential loan officers, besides its norrral service func-
tion. It is rare to find an individual aspiring to remain 
within the credit analysis area, almost all expect to be 
loan officers eventually. 
Two points relevant to this study should be high-
lighted. First, loan cffic~rs routinely ruake decisions as 
either individuals or as a member of a group. Many times, a 
single decision 1~ made sequentially as an individual, then 
as a group ~ember (or visa versa). Second, loan off1cers 
are not naive decision makers. They ace aware, and have 
been formally trained in statement analysis. 
Pr~cedure 
As mentioned, the experiment uti-lized bc.nk loan offi-
cers as subjects in a loan evaluation task. These loan 
officers were recruited through the senior banking otfi-
cials. The experiment ~as conducted during a prearran9ed 
one hour session at the subject•s place of employ•ent. Gen-
erally, several sessions during a single day at a particular 
bank were arranged. The subJects responded to the experi-
mental instruments in pairs. It was not unusu~l for the 
bank to provide a secluded area to conduct the experiment, 
so as to minimize the norrual distractiors attending commer-
cial lending. Prior to the experiment each subJect pair ~as 
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introduced to the researcher and told the general purpose of 
the experiment. The subjects ~ere told the purpose of the 
experiment was to determine the ability of professional 
statement users in interpreting financial statements. Fur-
therRore, they were informed that the experiment would be 
conducted in t~o phases, an individual and group phase. The 
researcher also defended the simplicity of the task relat1ve 
to an actual lending task by explaining to each subject the 
role of internal and external validity. This introduction 
also included a statement as to the assuwptions under which 
they were to operate. A list of these assumptions were pro-
vided for each subJ~ct, and is reproduced in Appendix A. 
The loan officers were asked to provide risk perception 
resvonses to an artificially generated set of financial 
statements and acconpanytng ratios. In addition, each sub-
ject was informed that the hypothetical firms ware small oil 
refining operationn. T~is made the footnotes more reasona-
ble, since they are common agreements in oil refining, and 
eliminated the need for a oil reserve study necessary for 
any type of exploration or drilling loan. Furthermore, each 
subject was told the close similarity between the firms was 
due t6 purposed construction by the researcher, thereby 
reducing suspicion as to the equivalence of the two firms. 
After providing resPonses·as individuals, the subjects 111ere 
asked to assemble into dyad groups for a similar analysis on 
a different artificial case. The researcher allowed the 
subjects to respond in privacy 
this way the subjects would 
during the group phase. 
not be inhibited by 
24 
In 
the 
researcher's presence. During tr.e 1ndiv1cual ~hase the 
researcher remained present to eliminate any conversation 
between the two participants. 
The experiment was constructed so as to highlight any 
subject risk perception differences for two types of off 
balance sheet versus on balance sheet financlng arranye-
ments. The two financing arrangeaents are the advance prod-
uction payment and the "throughput or deficiency" agreement 
(see Kelley C40l for a discussion on oft-bala~ce sheet 
financing reethods). In order to determine risk perception 
differen~es, each individual and group made evaluations 
across two artificial cases (the cases are reptcduced in 
Appendix A). · The t~o cases were similar within each group 
or individual phase, except tor different liability disclo-
sures. One case included the liability in the face of the 
statement, while the other disclosed the liability in foot-
note form. The two cases were different between each indi-
vidual and group phase. Therefore, each subject maae four 
statement evaluations, a matched pair as an individual and a 
different matched pair as a member of a two person group. 
The two matched pair~ were different as to relative account 
balances, and the li~ility used for on versus off statement 
comparisons. As discussed below the advance production pay-
ment and the "throughput or deficiency" agreement are simi-
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lar in economic substance.1 2 After providing responses tc 
the financial statements (Appendix B), each subject answered 
a post exPerimental questionnaire. 
Experimental Environment 
Advance production payments are common in the energy 
related industries. In form, a company in neEd of funds 
will contract to provide a set amount of production output 
to a second firm in return for a lump sum advance. In sub-
stance, the contracting firm is receiving a loan by guaran-
teeing peri odic pri nc ipl e and 1 nter est amortization in the 
form of product1on output. The bank provides tte second fir~ 
financing wholly on the contractual arrangement that exists 
for debt service. Figure 1 illustrates the transaction. 
PrEsEnt disclosure requirements for A allow either footnote 
and/or balance sheet presentation of the a~rangement. 
The "throughput and deficiercy" agreewent is commonly 
used for pipeline construction. Under tnis arrangement the 
taker guaractees to accept sufficient output to service the 
debt of the piveline project, which is carried by a joint 
venture. In substance, the risks and rewards ot ownership 
•A pilot study incorporating the above aesign was 
applied to students before proceeding to the field. 
~One half of the individuals received a matched pair of 
statements with the throu~~~ut liability and the ether halt 
received statements Wlth the prodLction payment. The group 
phase received tile opposite of ltlhat each member analyze a 
individually. 
Provider 
loan made 
on basis 
provides product 
guarantees payments 
of agreement 
Bank 
Taker 
Figure 1. Advance Production Payment 
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belong to the taker, even thoLgh the asset and related 
liability are kept off of the taker • s books. Figure 2 
illustrates the transactions envclved. Presertly most 
throughput or deficiency agreements are disclosed in the 
footnotes as a contingency.• 
Risk evaluation in the comnercial loan decision was 
chosen as the event of interest because of the presence of 
individual and small group decision making in the external 
environment, and because of the reliance upon 2ccounttng 
numbers in such a decision. The investment decision is a 
less appealing avenue of investigation because investor wel-
fare changes are a direct result oi equity ~arket changes. 
~A recent FASB Exposure Draft (30) has adrritted to 
alternative treatments of throughput agreements. Disclosing 
these types of agreernents as assets and liaDilities or in 
the footnotes as contingencies will be resolved atter the 
conceptual framework project is completed. Until that time 
the FASB enoorses footnote disclosure. 
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As such, investigation at the aggregate would appear to be 
the only fruitful position when attempting to make tangible 
conclusions with respect to accounting policy. Such a con-
dition does not exist with creditor institutions; therefore 
conclusions with respect to acco~nting information effects 
upon small groups would appear substantive. 
A 
guarantees output 
advances a lump sum B 
Bank 
loan made on 
basis of agree-
ment 
Figure 2. Throughput AgreeAent 
Many previous studies have supported the relevance of 
financial data in loan evaluation. Altman (3)~ Beaver {9), 
Deakin (18) 1 and Kennedy {41) have provided strong evidence 
as to the environmental validity of certain financial ratios 
in the prediciton of bankruptcy. Apparently this signiti-
cant predictive aoilitY has not gone unnoticed by loan ofti-
cers. Kennedy found evaluation of financial ratios to con-
stitute 35t of the financial analysis. Althou~h ratio data 
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are not the only source of information utilized by loan 
officers, they do represent a significant portion of the 
analysis ( 14). Furtherllore, Oliver• s (47) survey of bankers 
revealed a 65\ reliance on financial statements for loan 
evaluation. 
Description of the Subjects 
A post-experimental questionnnaire was completed by 
each of the 28 participants in the experiment (see Appendix 
8 for a reproduction of the questionnaire). From this, 
Table II (Appendix D) provides some background information 
on the commercial loan officers. 
Responses were obtained from commercial loan officers 
in either the metropolitan or energy divisions of the com-
mercial loan department. The energy division is generally 
composed of two or three officers, while the metropolitan 
division is considered the largest with anywhere from 10 to 
20 loan officers. As such, it was not possible to require 
all the loan officers to possess energy related experience. 
There would be not enough subjects for the experiment if 
such a restriction 111ere made. This is not of aajor concern, 
however, because the two off-balance sheet financing methods 
presented in the experiment are prevalent outside the energy 
field. Indeed, close to half of the subjects were familiar 
with these types of agreements. 
these financing agreements it was 
For those unfamiliar with 
assumed the text of the 
2S 
footnotes ~ould provide sufficient information as to the 
nature of the contract. 
Notice also that the subjects had extensive experience 
in loan evaluation (13 Yr• average), including a~soc1ations 
with oil related loans. 
Methodology 
The methodology was designed to control for both sub-
ject and firm variability. Each subJect evaluated twc 
statements that ~ere identical in all respects except for an 
·arbitrary size adjustment, and the liability disclosure. 
The size adjustment is an absolute change in the account 
balances, but is not a relative change. In ott:er words, 
since all the accounts are altered by the same percentage, 
there will be no change in the relative financial positions 
of the two hypothetical firms. Conversely, the liability 
disclosure will have an effect on specific acccunts only, 
therefore the account numbers will change relatively across 
.th.e two cases. 
The arbitrary size adjustment camouflages the similar-
tty between the two firms, since it is imperative the sub-
jects remain unaware of the equality of the two firms.4 The 
names of the fir~s were also disguised tor the sarrE purpose. 
Appendix A provides the statements ~sed in the analysis. 
----~--------------~ 
~Given two comparisons, say A and B, the size adJust-
ment iS counter-balanced such that A=.BB for one nalt fo the 
subjects, and B=.8A for the other half of the subjects. 
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Each subject made simultanecus risk evaluations over 
the two fir«s (see Appendix B for the questionnaire). Inef-
ficiency was defined as any subject response discrepencies 
between the two firms. In testing for the equality of risk 
perceptions over the two firms, subject variability and firm 
variability were controlled. Each subject acted as his own 
control over t~e two evaluations. This has the advantage of 
controlling for decision model differences between subjects. 
As a result, the decision model reed not be estimated or 
specified, allowing appropriate use of the final judgements 
in the analysis. The only substantive difference between 
the two firms is the liability disclosure, therefore any 
identified risk perception differences can be attributed to 
subject processing inefficiency with respect to the liabil-
ity disclosure. Firm differences and subject differences 
could not explain such a result. 
This approach was used for both the individual and 
group phases of the experiment. In the group phasE individ-
·uals were assigned to two man gcoups to ruake risk evalua-
tions on the two identical firms. The group consersus was 
used as the dependent variable in the analysis. 
Recall that each pair of statements are not or.ly dif-
ferent due to the disclosure format, but due elsa to ar. 
arbitrary size adjustment. Past studies (23) (1) have 
incorporated the size variable as a treatrrent ot interest. 
These studies found an unappreciable effect due to the size 
31 
variable. This result was also confirmed by the pilot 
study. As such, the size effect was not submitted to a 
priori analysis. 
~ach subject made decisions in sequence as an individ-
ual and as a me~ber of a group. One could argue that the 
order of the individual-grou~ seguence could have a marked 
effect on the processing ability co~partsons between the two 
phases (nawely, order effects on Ho(2)). If the group phase 
was administered first, information learned frore the group 
phase could be utilized in the individual phase. If the 
individual phase was administered first, ther. learning gen-
erated in that stage could be later applied in the group. 
In either case there is potential for pollution of the sec-
ond phase from the first. 
To control and test for such effects, one half of the 
subjects analyzed the matched pair statements zs groups 
first, then analyzed a different matched set as an individ-
ual. The other half of the subjects responded ir an oppo-
site order. If pollution effects are equal for either order 
or non existent, then comparisons between the two order 
sequences would be iimilar. If effects do exist, then one 
woule expect to find dissimilarities between the two order 
sequences. Such was the case in the pilot study {see .Appen-
dix C). Orter effects will be tested by analyzing Ho(l) ana 
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Ho{2) for each order partitlon. Differential results tor 
each partition would be evidence of an order effect. 
Statistics 
Both parametric and nonparametric statistics were used 
to test the Ho(l) hypotheses for Ql, 02, and 04 (questions 
1, 2, and 4, Appendix B). Thirty-t~o commercial loan loan 
officers made two simultaneous risk evaluations on identical 
firms. The dependent nature of this design allcws for the 
use of a parametric paired t test. The pajred t test is 
preferred over a two independent sample mean comparison, 
l. 
when the variance of 'the paired differences {6 0 ) is suffi-
ciently less than the variance of the individuals ( 2 6 1 ). 
This is necessary to compensate for the lost degrees of 
freedom fro« pairing. 0 0-... will be less than 26l when members 
of a pair are more similar than with members of different 
l pairs. An estimate of 6 0 can be con:pu ted as: 
: 5 1 + S~ - 2COV(variablel,variable2) (1) 
where s~ denotes the estimated variance. Thus, high covari-
ance (similarity within pairs) reduces the esti~ate of the 
difference variance. The use of this test eliminates the 
extraneous variance that exists within the subject pair, and 
therefore increases the ability of the test to detect small 
differences between the two samples. A nonparametric equiv-
alent utilizing the sign (Sign Test) of the differences ~as 
also applied to the dependent samples to test Ho(l). 
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An analysis of t3 required a citferent approach. The 
question requires the subject to make a choice between the 
two firms in the matched pair. Theoretically the probabil-
ity of choosing either firm is one halt, since both tirms 
are equivalent. The distribution of possible cutcomes is 
represented by a binomial curernulative function tor p=l/2. 
The observed proportion can be tested against the theoreti-
cal (1/2) by using the binomial distr~bution. A significant 
dlfference between the observed and theoretical proportion 
is a rejection of Ho(l). In ether words, a rejection 
implies the subjects generally preferred one f1rn over the 
other, when in actuality they should have been indifferent 
between the choices. 
The subjects were also arranged into two person groups 
to make paired risk evaluations on a different set of finan-
cial statements.s Again, a paired t test with its nonparame-
tric equivalent are appropriate for testing the Ho(l) 
hypothesis. 
A comparison test between the individual and yroup 
responses can be achieved by com~aring the indepe~dent sam-
ple means of the group and individual differences. An inde-
pendent sample t test appears appropriate, because tne roean 
~The group phase financial statements include a differ-
ent type of financing arrangement. The two types cf project 
financing arrangements (production payment and "throughput 
or deficiency") are counter-balarlcEd between the 1ndlv~dual 
and group phases. 
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differences obtained in the group phase of the experiment is 
based upon a different financial statement pair than under 
the individual phase. Even though there is subject depen-
dency across the two experimental phases, the change in the 
financials would appear substantive enough to warrant inde-
pendent treatment of the means. Therefore, Ho(2) was tested 
via an independent sample t test on the relevant dependent 
variables. e 
Dependent Variables 
A major concern of commercial loan officers is loan 
risk. Tne analysis of risk can be thought of as occurring 
at two lev~ls. At the first level the loan officer is 
interested in making a simple discrimination between accept-
able and unacceptable lean opportunities. This is probably 
the loan officer's primary goal, to discriminate between 
poor and favorable loan risks. A loan officer's failure in 
this area eventually will lead to career failure. Once loan 
acceptability is determined the loan officer will next 
atteDpt to price the loan so as to maximize the bank's yield 
at minimal r tsk. Herein lies the second level, to incorpo-
rate rtsk assessment along with other relevant variables in 
recommending an interest rate for the loan. Failure here is 
not as critical as failure at the first level. 
~------~~~---------
8 Cronbach and Furby (17) suggest an alternative statis-
tical approach utilizing covariance analysis. 
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The dependent variables attempted to capture the 
lending environment by requiring the lending officers to 
evaluate loan opportunities with respect to risk. Beyono 
this, variables were chosen to determine the relative per-
ceived tavorability of one firm over the other in the 
matched pair evaluations. The same variables were used in 
both the individual and group phases. 
The first variable is an interest rate assignment on 
the loan. It was assumed in all cases that the loan woul~ 
be granted. 
PRICE: An interest rate recommendation as a per-
centage of the prime rate. 
This variable was requested as a percentage of prime so as 
to facilitate co~parison and aggregation. Even if the loan 
officers are operating under different prime rates an inter-
est rate recommendation as a percent ot prime provides a 
relative measure. It is further assumed that this variable 
is some~hat sensitiv~ to risk perceptions. Supposedly, the 
higher the perceived risk the higher the interest rate 
response will be. 
The second variable attempted to discover the perceived 
riskiness of the loan apart from other prtcing variables. 
DEFAULT: The probability of loan default as per-
ceived by the subject tor the firm. 
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One would expect an unfavorable financial positior to eli-
cite responses of higher default probability than more 
favorable financial positions. 
the third variable forces the subject to choose between 
the two firt~s. 
CHOICE: The choice of only one of the two compet-
ing loan applications in the matched pair. 
If the subjects systematicallY perceive one firm to be 
favored over another then one would expect that preference 
to be indicated by a high frequEncy of responses for that 
firm in this variable. If both firms are perceived as 
equivalent opportunities, then the CHOICE variable should 
not selectively favor one firm over another. 
The fourth variable sets up a rather contrived condi-
tion whereby each subject must allocate a fixed a"ount of 
available funds between the two loan opportunities in the 
matched set. 
ALLOCATE: A percentage allocat1on of fixed av2ila-
ble funds to the two companies. Both allocations 
must add to 100~. 
It both firms ace perceived as equivalents then equal allo-
cations between the two firms would be expected. In con-
trast, if one firru was preferred over another firn, tnen one 
would eXPect an unequal allocation with a greater share 
accruing to the favored firm. 
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All four dependent variables attempt to determine if 
one loan opportunity appears more attractive than another. 
The first two variables request 1ndependent assessments on 
the two firms, while the second two variables force direct 
comparisons bet~een the two firms. Recall once more that 
the two firms are equivalent except for liability format 
disclosures, so that any differences in the responses to 
these variables for the two firms is an indication of proc-
essing inefficiency. It will be these differences between 
PRICE, DEFAULT, and ALLOCATE across the two firms that will 
form the dependent variables in the analyses to follow. 
Methodological Conclusions 
The experiment described above was applied at an indi-
vidual and group leYel of aggregation. The instr~nents were 
designed in such a way so as to present accounting policy 
changes without conc~rrent economic changes. As such, com-
plete processing of the accounting data would sug~est reac-
tions to only underlying informational qualities of the 
accounting rePorts rather than sinple format changes. How-
ever, g~en price evidence, one would expect some ineffi-
cienCies to result at the individual level. 
The analysis of group behavior advances a step beyond 
the scope of most of the prior behavioral research. If 
accounti~g processing efficiencies do indeed increase with 
user aggregation then one would expect to observe increased 
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group awareness of the underlying economic realities, and 
therefore, smaller disparities in risk assessmert for on 
versus oft-balance sheet presentations. 
The conclusions of an 1nvesti9ation on group responses 
to accounting format changes should hopefully be of interest 
to accounting policy makers. Presently, policy makers rely 
on individual processing research, ano to some degree capi-
tal market research. Neither ~f these research pursuits 
provide evidence on the information processing capabilities 
of groups. 
by groups, 
Since there is pervasive use of accourting data 
the following evidence into group processing 
capabilities woula appear useful. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
Two Avenues of Analysis 
Th~ interpretation of this experiment can b~ approached 
from two avtnues. One can think o1 these two approaches in 
• 
terms of either considering or not considering the sign ot 
the differences. 
An argument could be made that any inefficiercies dis-
covered in the subjects• process1n~ can be a priori speci-
fied as to direction. Specifically, if the p~ocessing of 
ace ounting intorma ti on is in eft ici en t then one c cul d expect 
the loan opportunity with the footnote liability presenta-
tion to be favored over the firm with the balance sheet 
presentation of the liability. The argument suggests the 
loan officers tend to Ignore the footnote liability, and 
instead focus mainly upon the financial ratio information. 
If this is indeed the case, then the firm with the footnote 
liability will display more favorable ratios then the firm 
with the liability on the balance sheet. Therefore, ineffi-
ciencies are expected and the sign is predicted • The firm 
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with the footnote will be favored over the equivalent firm 
without the footnote. 
Under an alternative view a£y descrepencles in percep-
tion between the two firms is ineffiecient no matter which 
firm is favored. Although it may be difficult to explain 
why a firm with the liability on the balanc~ sheet is 
favored over an equivalent firm w1th oft balance sheet 
financing, such a result is still an evldence of ineffici-
ency. 
The first view allows positive and negative differences 
to cancel each other out. The result is a statistic that 
will show the ~!~~~ll subject performance. The second view 
is more indiVidualistic. Differences are not constrained as 
to sign (i.e. absolute values are usea), therefore the 
resulting statistic will be an average of iD~l~l~~~l ineffi-
ciencies. 
Results of Ho(l)-Sign Considered 
As mentioned previously the efficiency of groups and 
individuals, independently, will be tested via a paired t 
test. For both the individuals and the groups the hypothe-
sis can be rewritten: 
Ho(l): d =0 tor PRICE, DEFAULT, and ALLOCATE 
Ha(l): d <0 for PRICE and DEfAULT. 
Ha(l): d >0 for ALLOCATE 
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Again it is assumed that the sign of the average oitferer.ces 
(d) is relevant. For PRICE and DEFAUL1, in tbe event of 
inefficient responses, one would expect a larger numerical 
response for the Dalance sheet presEntati~n of the liab1l1ty 
than for the footnote presentation. Sirnilarly, given inef-
ficiencies., a greater allocation ot loanable tunes to the 
footnote firm than to the balance sheet firm could be 
expected. 
Table III, (Appendix· D) presents the results of the 
paired t test for the individuals. For the 28 loan ctticers 
only DEFAULT approaches significance at the .10 level. 
Curiously, ALLOCATE does not even possess the expected sign 
and PRICE does not approach significance. This is some~~o~hat 
contrary to a priori expectations. 
The group results are presented in Table IV, (Appendix 
D). The group results indicate g~neral processing effi-
ciency except on the PRICE variable. Evidently, the groups 
priced the t~o loans differently. Since the sign is in the 
appropriate direction it can be surmised the liability dis-
closure was the cause of such a result. The other two vari-
ables did not approach significarce, but demonstrate some 
inefficient effects bY possessing the expected sign tor 
inefficiEncy. 
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Nonparametric Sign Test 
.l second analyt leal technique for testing the equality 
of two dependent samples is the sign test. The sign test is 
a derivation of the binomial test where the probability for 
a 1 + 1 or •-• is 1/2, under the null hypothesis. The signs 
tn this case represent the signs of the differences on the 
aatched pair responses. In the event of processing effi-
ciency one would expect an approximately equal representa-
tion of sign among the differences. The asymptotic relative 
efficency of the sign test to the paired t test is .637 
(16). This is a measure of the sample size efficiency 
between the two tests at the same alpha and beta levels. 
Table Y (Appendix D) provides the ~ign test results on 
the individuals• responses.• The results of the sign test 
are markedly different from the para11etric results. In two 
out of the three variables the test approaches significance, 
while for DEFAULT the test is close to the .10 level. These 
results indicate that the subjects were inefficient with 
respect to the sign of their responses, although not neces-
sarily with the magnitude of those responses. 
Ti1e sign test was also used to test the group results. 
Table VI (Appendix D) provides a summary. Again, these 
results indicate some inefficiency relative to the sign of 
&fies or • zero differences• are excluded in this analy-
sis. 
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the differences. Both PRICE and ALLOCATE have sign frequen-
cies indicating a preference for the loan application with 
footnote disclosure. The DEFAULT variable is clearly not 
significant. 
A Wilcoxon rank test for matched pairs was not applied 
to the data because the necessary assumptions of a symmetri-
cal distribution function and continuous random variables 
did not appear to be met. 
Clearly the sign tests above cannot be·taken as evi-
dence by themselves, but should be interpreted in light of 
the parametric results. Apparently, the footnote firm is 
favored over the balance sheet firm in the majority of 
cases. However, this preference is not great enough in mag-
nitude to deliver a rejection of Ho(l) for all variables. 
In coabining the results of both tests it appears as though 
inefficiency is present in individuals as evidenced by the 
DEFAULT variable, and is also present in groups as indicated 
by the PRICE variable and somewhat by the ALLOCATE variable. 
The CHOICE variable requires a somewhat different anal-
ysis because of its dichotomous nature. If Ho(l) is true 
then a forced choice between the two loan opportunities 
should provide nearly equivalent preference frequencies for 
each firm. This can be tested via a Binomial test with 
p=l/2. Table VII (Appendix D) provides the individual 
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results. As can be seen, the relative choice frequencies 
are not equivalent. Approximately 68% of the respondents 
chose the statements with footnote disclosure over the 
statements with balance sheet disclosure. Apparently, the 
favorable ratios of the footnote firm over the balance sheet 
firm affected the subjects• preferences. 
A similar result is present in the group decision mak-
ing as can be seen in Table VIII (Appendix D). The groups 
also favor the firm with the more attractive financial rat-
ios. In both cases there is a clear trend towards ineffi-
cient responses in a dichotomous forced choice setting. 
overall, when the sign is considered there appears to 
·be ample evidence of inefficient preference towards the 
footnote firm at both the individual and group level. 
Analysis of Results-Absolute Values 
Ttte prior analysis on the mean of the signed differ-
ences allows the positive and negative differences to cancel 
each other in aggregation. To understand the efficiency of 
the J..D.dJ.Jl.i.d.ua.l~ in the experimental task, an analysis on 
absolute values of the differences becomes desirable. Such 
an approach considers any difference between the matched 
statement responses to be evidence of inefficiency. The 
absolute differences were averaged to obtain the mean of the 
iD.din!lu.al inefficiencies, irrespective of direction. 
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lqatn, a paired t test was used· to test the Ho(l) 
hypothesis on the absolute differences. Table IX (Appendix 
D) displays the individuals• results. 
When the mean of the absolute differences are compared 
to zero there is a clear rejection of the null hypothesis. 
Given the results of Table III (Appendix D) and Table V 
(Appendix D) together, there would appear to be responses 
causing positive differences. In fact, from the sign test, 
this is known to be the case. In addition, the positive 
differences must be of relatively high magnitude to cause 
such large increases in the absolute mean differences over 
the mean differences of Table III (Appendix D). This would 
seem to be true because there were not many positive differ-
ences. 
A similar approach was applied to the group data. 
Table X (Appendix D) provides a summary of the results. 
Although the t values are not as large as in the individu-
als• cesults, Ho{l) can still be rejected at a .10 level. 
When considec ing the mean of the absolute differences 
there is a clear indication that the subjects evaluated the 
two matched firms differently, but that the direction of the 
difference is somewhat less obvious. Most subjects did pro-
vide some inefficient responses based upon the favorability 
of the footnote financial statements over the non-footnote 
stateaents. However, the analysis of the absolute dif·fer-
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ences indicate that the inefficiency 1s more complex than 
such a simple explanation. Some s~bJects, just as inefti-
Ciently, favored the firm with the less favorable ratios 
{liability on the balance sheet) over the firm with the more 
favorable ratios (liability in the footnotes). 
Results of Ho(2)-Sign Considered 
The second hypothesis addresses the question of ~hether 
the groups are more efficient in the processing of account-
ing information than are the individuals. As mentioned, a 
two independent sample t test ap~ecrs to be the appropriate 
statistic for answering this question. The hypothesis can 
be expressed as follows: 
Ho{2): d-=~ for PRICE, DEFAULT,andALLOCATE 
I '3 
Ha(2}: d; >d~ for PRICE, DEFAULT,andALLOCATE 
where d; is the average difference score for the individuals 
and d3 is the average di.fference score for the groups. 
·Table XI, (Appendix D) shows the results of this test. 
The results are very clear. In no instance can the 
null hypothesis be rejected tn ta~or of the alternative. In 
fact, the PRICS and ALLOCATE variables produce greater 1nef-
f 1 c 1 e nc i t:>.S in t n e g r o ups t h a n in t h e in d i v 1 d u a l s, w h i c h i s 
the opposite of expectations. Even for the CHOICE variable 
analyzed 1n Table VII, (Appendix D) and Table VIIi, (Appen-
dix D), the groups were slightly More inefficient. 
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Results of Ho(2)-Absolute Values 
A comparison of the mean differences in absolute terms 
reveals the sa•e conclusions as above. The results are 
~roduced in Table XII (Appendix D). Even though both the 
groups and individuals were inefficient in their responses 
towards the two firms, they were not significantly different 
in their inefficiency. Again, Ho(2) cannot be rejected for 
any of the variables. 
Order Effects-Sign Considered 
I~~:Ung liQ. < 1> Iln~ltu:. f.a.t:.ti:ti~n~d U.a.ta 
Sel.s 
Th.e order of group versus individuals responses could 
have a significant impact upon an interpretation of the 
results. Order effects would especially be evident in the 
event of carryover effects from one phase to another. To 
test for such a possibility the Ho(l) and Ho(2) hypotheses 
were reevaluated on data sets partitioned by the order of 
response. Table XIII (Appendix D) provides the Ho(l) 
results for the individuals on the partitioned data set. 
The results indicate a sharp contrast between the two 
orders of response. When the individual phase occurred 
after the group phase there was no support tor inefficient 
information processing. In contrast, when the individual 
phase occurred first there was a distinct trend towards 
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inefficiency. This was evidenced by the negative signifi-
cance of the PRICE and DEFAULT variables from zero. 
Likewise, the group responses were also partitioned and 
reanalyzed. Table XIV (Appendix D) displays the results. 
The conclusions to be drawn are siailar to the individual 
phase results. When the groups respond first there is lit-
tle indication of inefficient processing of the accounting 
data. However, when the groups respond after the individual 
phase there is ample evidence of inefficient processing. 
All three variables approach significance at the .10 level, 
which is in sharp contrast to the results in the opposite 
order. 
ta~~iD9 Ha<2> Uog~t ~~tilio~~ Qgta 
ael~:Si~D CQDS!O~t~~ 
fo determine if the order of responses had an effect on 
the Ho(2) results, a two independent sample t test vas per-
formed on the partitioned data sets. Table XV (Appendix D) 
shows the results. Unfortunately there is no support for 
Ho(2) in either of the partitioned sets. Apparently, the 
groups are not significantly more efficient than the indi-
viduals for either the aggregate or partitioned sets. 
Order Effects-Absolute Values 
The same statistical procedure will be used to discover 
if there are any order effects on the absolute values of the 
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variables as shown in Table XVI (Appendix 0}. curiously, 
there does not appear to be as much of an order effect on 
the absolute values as there was on the signed variables. 
For the individuals the inefficiency persisted, even when 
the individual phase was sequenced first. The groups also 
produced similar responses for the two sequence orders. 
For a partitioned test of Ho(2) with absolute values 
the results were much the same as for the signed variables. 
In no case were the group responses significantly more effi-
cient (smaller) than the individual responses. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary of Ho(l) Results 
Table XVII (Appendix D) and Table XVIII (Appendix D) 
provide a simple summary of the analyses presented in the 
previous chapter. For each o.f the four dependent variables 
the test results are categorized by the various statistical 
approaches reported. The following code is used: 
NS= not significant 
S = significant 
Nl= not appropriate 
where the significance of a particular response indicates 
processing inefficiency. 
ls can be seen there is a strong similarity between the 
individual and group results. Both phases exhibit moderate 
decision making ine.fficiency with respect to the signed pair 
t and _sign test. For six possibilities there are three sig-
nificant results in both cases. The binomial test on the 
CHOICE variable is highly significant in both cases. Ana-
lyzing the paired t results further by part! ttoning the 
results according to response sequence reve~ls an interest-
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ing trend. Wnen groups respond second both groups and 
individuals display inefficiency that does not exist for the 
opposite sequence. When the sign of the differences is 
ignored highly significant mean differences on tfte paired t 
test obtains. This is true regardless of response sequence 
order. Such a result may be due to an overestimation of the 
effect of the footnote on the financial position of the 
firm. 
Although the results are not unanimous, there appears 
to be processing inefficiency at the individual and group 
level of aggregation. Such a result is particularly evident 
when the inefficiency 1s not constrained as to sign. Th€ 
order of sequence also has a marked effect on the results. 
Individuals apparently gain some expertise with the proble~ 
by participating in a group discussion of a similar problem 
first. The groups fair better if they do not solve a simi-
lar problem first as an individual. Possibly, an erroneous 
solution scheme is fixed during the individual phase and 
carried through to the group phase. When the groups respond 
first, such a scheme may also be fixed. However, the scheme 
may be more accurate due to group interaction and input. 
Such a conclusion supports an anchor bias explanation as 
discussed by Tversty and Kahneman (56). 
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Su111111ary of Ho(2) Results 
The second hypothesis results reveal whether or not the 
groups are more sophisticated than the individuals. A sig-
nificant difference between the group and individual mean 
responses would oe evidence of this a priori expectation. 
Unfortunately, Table XIX (Appendix D) reveals that in no 
instance did the groups outperform the individuals. This 
was even true when the responses were partitioned as to 
response order. 
Conclusions 
Recall that the a priori expectations were for individ-
ual inefficiency and group efficiency, ·with a significant 
difference between the two. A pilot study provided results 
consistent with these expectations. Unfortunately, the 
results with sophisticated subjects were less accommodating. 
The individuals appeared to be inefficient, as was expected; 
however, the groupswere just as inefficient. In fact the 
siailarity of the groups and individuals resulted in no sig-
nificant differences in the level of response efficiency 
between the two aggregations. There are several reasons why 
such a result lllight occur. 
First, the dependent variables may not be relevant in 
the loan decision, and therefore unfamiliar to the subjects. 
This seems highlY unlikely according to the personal inter-
views obtained from senior and executive level loan offi-
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cers~ The pr1ctng variable and default variable c2pture the 
main task responsibilities of the officers. The choice and 
allocate variables produce a contrived environment, but 
still should not have caused confus1on or ~isinterpretation. 
A second explanation would suggest that the relatively 
small group sample size reduces the power of the tests. As 
a result any conclusions may not be accurately inferred from 
the population of bank loan officers. This is clearly a 
legitimate concern that only more extensive data collect1on 
could answer. 
Third, the group size may have an effect on the grou~ 
responses. In the pilot study, group sizes of three were 
utilized while the main .study used only two perscn groups. 
It Js possible that certain dynamics present in a three per-
son group may taster decision making efficiency that does 
not exist in a two person group. Certain salient features 
of groups that would aid decision making are present tn both 
types of groups. 
of ideas between 
Both sizes require the verbal Interaction 
the partners, and the input of more than 
one member. However, a group of three has the advantage of 
adding a single ~ind or viewpoint to the discussion. Again, 
only future research could answer the question of whether an 
added group member would signific~ntly increase the group 
processing efficiency. 
Fourth, the results may be a function of the subjects 
themselves. The students performed to expectations, but the 
professionals did not. Possibly 
tion was not sufficiently versed 
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this professio~~l popula-
in financial statement 
analysis to be able to accornodate tne task. There was some 
indication of this as some subjects required explanations 
for several of the financial ratios. For many of the sub-
jects it had been a long time since they were required tG 
perform formal statement analyses. Although one would have 
expected the loan officers to be sufficiently capable of 
elementary staterrent interpretaticn, such may not have been 
the case. 
It is possible the inefficiencies stem· frc~ the 431 
that did not possess axperience in oil related loans. To 
investigate tnis possibility deeper, the groups and individ-
uals were segregated as to their oil loan Experience. Sur-
prisingly, the results persisted for the experienced sub-
jects. The paired t results indicated several sign1f1cant 
mean differences for the individuals and groups with oil 
related expertise. In no case were the individual and group 
responses significantly different form each other ~ithin the 
experienced class. 
To conclude, this study indicated that both the groups 
ana individuals possessed a moderate amount ol ~neftici~ncy. 
Furthermore, this inefficiency was not significantly differ-
ent between the two classes. 
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Accounting Implications 
If the conclusions of this research can be replicated 
in tuture studies, then there exist certain ~oltcy implica-
tions relative to groups and individuals. 
The presence of group and individual processing of 
accounting data by t~e credit granting community requires a 
broader set of objectives in policy development, then those 
suggested by Beaver. The welfare changes ~f bank loan offi-
cers, or even more basically bank stockholders, is a func-
tion of rate of return. Rate ot return is further a func-
tion of pricing and minimizing loan losses. The decisions 
pertinent to pricing and risk assessment are made by small 
groups and individuals. Unfortunately, these groups and 
individuals were found to be inefficient information proc-
essors on a fairly simple task. In contrzst to the point 
consistent with aggregate market research, these inefficien-
cies must be taken into consideration during policy develop-
ment if a broad view of user need is to be obtained. 
such considerations should recognize that siwple foot-
note disclosure of information may not be sufficient to 
guarantee etficient loan appraisal. Besides the rroblems of 
information overload, the credit granting community may not 
be sufficiently versed in accounting to a~ply the added 
information in meeting their needs. Furthermore, diverse 
choices in accounting method, as in different formats for 
liability disclosure, can only cause to hamper the loan 
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officer's and credit analyst•s ability to interpret the 
economic postion of a firm. 
Footnote disclosure appears to be is a less preferable 
method of disclosing an economic event that could alterna-
tively be placed on the balance sheet. This research indi-
cated that to a great extent the loan officers did not cor-
rectly assiwilate the footnote information. The nature of 
credit analysis biases against footnote information. Credit 
analysis is still basic ratio, cress-sectional, and trend 
analyses derived from the face of the statements. Rarely de 
the credit summaries advance beyond the aggre~ated numerical 
data. 
Limitations 
As with all research attemptlng to obtain responses in 
a contrived setting, there exists the proolem cf external 
validity. This project was no exce~tion. The experimental 
task was c~nstructed so as to re~l1cate the external envi-
ronment without presenting complexities that would overbur-
den the subjects. Most of the loan officers ~auld have 
desired additional information in making the kinds of deci-
sions required by this study. Some of the mere common 
requests were tor a five year history (insteaa of the two 
year comparatives), current asset information <receivable 
aging, inventory composition and Racketability), outstanding 
debt terms, common size financial statements, and a funds 
51 
statement. Although it may have been desirable to include 
additional data such as the above, it was not feasible under 
the session time constraints. Furthermore, interral valid-
ity could have oeen diroinished by s~ch additional data. It 
does not appear desirable to sacrifice internal validity tor 
external validity. The outcome would be a study that 
reflects the real world environment, but does not reliably 
answer the researcher•s question of interest. 
The lack of data co~plexity could be ca~se tor another 
concern. It is possible that the treatment condition (lia-
bility disclosure format) was toe obvious to the subjects. 
The two comparative financial statements may not have been 
camouflaged enough. This does net appear to be a valid 
criticism. First, it is desirable· that the treatnent condi-
tion provides a clear signal1 and is not hidden amcng a mass 
of data. Without such a clear signal, the internal validity 
of the study could be hampered. Second, the results don't 
appear to confirm this accusation. If the subjects were 
·able to ••see through« the instruments, then ttere should 
have been no discrepencies in the variable values. This was 
not the case. In many instances the discrepencies were sig-
nificantly different than zero. 
The results of this study coula be limited by the 
lack of any subJect motivation towards the experimetal task. 
It was not possible to duplicate tne rewara structure pres-
ent in the bankiny environment, so it is possible the sub-
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Jects did not provide thoughtful rEsponses. It should be 
noted, however, that the researcher's observatlcns did not 
confirm this potential criticism. Nearly all of the sub-
jects used the maximum available time. Likewise, many ot 
the subjects appeared diligent in performing the task. 
A fourth limitation envolves an alternative explanation 
for the results, that was not directly tested by this study. 
It is possible that, in practice, the different liability 
disclosures communicate different levels of riskiness to the 
loan officers. Such levels could be explained by the atti-
tudes of the debtors (statement preparers) when given alter-
native disclosure options. As an example, the manager of a 
firm ruay attempt to "hide" a liability in the footrotes ~hen 
he perce~es his firm as highly levered. Therefore, foot-
note pr~entation cculd provide a~ informatin d2tum that 
caul~ account for differEnt risk assessments by loan offi-
cers. Under such an explanation, different risk assessments 
would not be a result of inefficient application of account-
ing data, at least not as defined in this paper. 
Implications for Future Research 
This study does not provide a final ans~er to the pro-
posed question, nor was it ev~r intended to do·so. Given 
the somewhat surprislng results of this study, it wculd 
appear that future research ln this area could be fruitful. 
Specifically, future research might attempt to discover why 
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professional, supposedly sophisticated, subjects do not 
increase their processing efficie~cy in a group setting. 
For purposes of answering this question the differences 
bet~een student subjects and professionals should be 
addressed. Additifrnally, different aggregation levels, say 
three or four person groups, might te investigated. 
Apparently, the choice of subjects is critical to the 
results obtained. Future work should choose a different 
subject population, such as credit analysts or investment 
analysts. Likewise, a difterent psychological effect could 
be investigated. This study closely approximates previous 
work in the functional fixation area. Other areas such as 
information overload effects, anchor biases, representative 
biases, and availability biases (56) could be examined at 
the indivldual and group levels. 
In general, future work should focus upon different 
variables so as to discover the significant features in 
finding or not finding group precessing etfic1ency ever 
·individuals. 
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Brown=(.S)Green 
\'Jhite=(.S)Brown 
Black=(.S)Blue 
Red=(.8)Brown 
Individuals 
Footnote 
Disclosure 
Brown 
Brown 
Balance Sheet 
Disclosure 
Green 
White 
Groups 
Footnote 
Disclosure 
Black 
Black 
Balance Sheet 
Disclosure 
Blue 
Red 
Figure 3. Experimental Instruments 
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Assumptions 
1.) These two applications are the only ones presently 
in your files. 
2.) Both firms are fairly mature firms, and have worked 
with your bank since their inception. 
).) Both firms intend to use the funds for short term 
operations. 
4.) Repayment will be made by a single lump sum payment 
generated from operations. 
5.) The managements of both· firms expect p,ast trends 
to continue into the near future. 
6.) Each firm will maintain a 20% compensating balance. 
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The Brown Oil Company 
Statement of Financial Position 
Fiscal Year End 
Assets 
Current Assets 
Cash 
Marketable Securities 
Accounts Receivable 
Inventories(at cost) 
Total Current Assets 
Plant & Equipment 
Total Assets 
Liabilities 
Current Liabilities 
Notes Payable 
Acco~~ts Payable & Accrued Liabilities 
Current Maturities on Long-Term Debt 
Total Current Liabilities 
Long-Term Debt 
Deferred Credits 
Deferred Taxes 
Stockholder's Equity 
Common Stockholder's Equity 
Retained Earnings 
Total Stockholder's Equity 
Total Liabilities & Stockholder's Equity 
19X2 
505,000 
6)4,700 
),152,000 
),001,500 
7,29),200 
1 J' 667 LZQ_Q. 
$20,960,900 
920,000 
4,)86,200 
21.5,100 
5,521,)00 
5.055.400 
1,105,900 
767,800 
~<h.5_00 
2_,2{8,)00 
$20,960,200 
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19X1 
479,000 
621,300 
J,J68,6oo 
~_L~Q 7,2o , 00 
10,{10,000 
$17,978,400 
861,000 
4,562,900 
_ __1_20 600 5,61~ 
),355,400 
1,068,100 
622,)00 
z,Jls,ooo 
7,9LJO,)OO 
$1£,928,400 
The Brown Oil Company 
Statement of Income 
Fiscal Year 
Net Sales 
Costs &: Expenses 
Cost of Product Sold 
Selling & General Expenses 
Depletion &: Depreciation 
Taxes, other than income taxes 
Interest & Debt Expense 
Net Income 
Summary of Notes to the Statements 
19X2 
")0,864,500 
24,888,700 
2,964,100 
1,061,400 
. 450,000 
307,800 
$ 1,192,500 $ 
19X1 
2?,469,700 
22,144,100 
2,864,300 
929,600 
4)1, 100 
246,100 
854,500 
1.} All financial statements are audited with an unqualified 
auditoris opinion. 
2.} There are nounsatisfied judgements or legal suits pending. 
J,) Inventories are valued under the LIFO cost flow assumption, 
4,) Fixed assets are depreciated under the straight line method. 
S.) The Company follows the successful efforts method of accounting 
for exploration and development costs. 
6,) At the beginninG of 19Xl the company entered into a gas production 
payment agreement whereby it was to receive $2,100,000 from 
the Natural Gas Co.(NGC). Under the agreement the Company 
has dedicated a percentage of gas production revenues for 
repayment of the purchase amounts and interest on NGC's 
financing arrangements, The payments for 19X1 and 19X2 
on this agreement each crune to $150,000 of which $80,000 
is related to the interest costs. This payment was netted 
against the gas revenues, Repayment of the production payments 
is being made solely out of the revenues derived from recovered 
gas applicable to this agreement. 
The Green Oil Co~pany 
Statement of Financial Position 
Fiscal Year End 
Assets 
Current Assets 
Cash 
Marketable Securities 
Accounts Receivable 
Inventories(at cost) 
Total current Assets 
Plant & Equipment 
Total Assets 
Liabilities 
Current Liabilities 
Notes Payable 
Accounts Payable & Accrued Liabilities 
Current Maturities on Long-Term Debt 
Total current Liabilities 
Long-Term Debt 
Deferred Credits 
Deferred Tuxes 
StocY~older's Equity 
Common Stockholder's Equity 
Retained Earnings 
Total Stockholder's Equity 
Total Liabilities & Stockholder's Equity 
19X2 
531,200 
79),400 
4,127,500 
2z..'Z21 200 9,20~000 
19,184,600 
$28,)88,600 
1,150,000 
5,482,800 
J56000 
"b,989,ioo 
8,769,200 
1,)82,)00 
959,800 
10,288,100 
11 '242.J..2.00 
$28, )88 ,_600 
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19X1 
498,700 
776,600 
L!-,)98,200 
..h_ 429 t ;200 
9,173,000 
1:..2J 250! 000 
$24 1 22J 1 000 
1,076,400 
5,70),600 
___E_5,~0Q 
7,105, 00 
6,7)1,700 
1,JJ5,100 
777,900 
§,922,500 
_2..LZjQ, 4 0 Q_ 
$24,92),000 
, Net Sales 
Costs & Expenses 
The Green Oil Company 
Statement of Income 
Fiscal Year 
Cost of Product Sold 
Selling & General Expenses 
Depletion & Depreciation 
Taxes, other than income taxes 
Interest & Debt Expense 
Net Income 
Summary of Notes to the Statements 
19X2 
)8,768,100 
)1,110,900 
),705,100 
1,589,200 
562,500 
484,800 
$ 1,Jl5,600 $ 
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19Xl 
)4,524,600 
27,680,100 
J,580,400 
1,424,500 
538,900 
40?,600 
89),100 
1.) All financial statements are audited with an unqualified 
auditor's opinion 
2.) There are no unsatisfied judgements or legal suits pending 
).) Inventories are valued under the LIFO cost flow assumption. 
4.) Fixed assets are depreciated under the straight line method. 
5.) The Company follows the successful efforts method of accounting 
for exploration and development costs. 
Su~~ary of Financial Ratios 
for the Two ·Firms 
Industry Brown Green 
-Average Oil Co •. Oil co. 
Ratio 19X2 19X1 19X2 19Xl 
Return on Total Assets .06? .057 .047 .046 .036 
Current Ratio 1.51 1.32 1.29 1.32 1.30 
Quick Ratio 
.96 .77 .so • 78 .804 
Current Assets to Total Assets .)6 .)5 .40 .• J2 .)7 
Sales to Net Working Capital 17.46 17.42 16.61 17.50 16.40 
Total Debt to Stockholders• Equity 1.20 1.26 1.26 1.52 1.56 
Return on Stockholders' Equity .1)2 .128 .1 08 .117 .092 
Interest Coverage 9.)7 4.87 4.47 ). 71 3.19 
The White .Oil Company 
Statement of Financial Position 
Fiscal Year End 
Assets 
·current Assets 
Cash 
Marketable Securities 
Accounts Receivable 
Inventorles(at cost) 
Total Current Assets 
Plant & Equipment 
Total Assets 
Liabilities 
Current Liabilities 
Notes Payable 
Accounts Payable & Accrued Liabilities 
Current Maturities on I,ong-Term Debt 
Total Current Liabilities 
Long-Term Debt 
Deferred Credits 
Deferred Taxes 
Stockholder's Equity 
Common Stockholder's Equity 
Retained Earnings 
Total Stockholder's Equity 
Total Liabilities & Stockholder's Equity 
19X2 
)40,000 
507,800 
2,641,600 
2,401,200 
s. 890, 6<ro 
12,278!200 
$18,1681800 
7)6,000 
),509,000 
228,100 
4,47),100 
5,612,)00 
884,700 
614,)00 
h584,400 
z,198,?oo 
$~!}8,800 
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19Xl 
319,200 
497,000 
2,81L},800 
?~liL?_Q_(~ 
5,870,?00 
10!0801000 
:P~'ZQQ_ 
688,900 
),650,)00 
208 L2_00 
4,547,700 
4,)08,200 
854,500 
497.900 
,2 1 742,4oo. 
61240,)00 
$],_2-L22Q_LZ.QQ 
Net Sales 
Costs & Expenses 
The White Oil company 
Statement of Income 
.Fiscal Year 
Cost of Product Sold 
Selling & General Expenses . 
Depletion & Depreciation 
'l'axe s, other than income taxes 
Interest & Debt Expense 
Net Income 
Summar~ of Notes to the Statements 
19X2 
24,811,600 
19.911,000 
2,)71,)00 
1,017,100 
)60,000 
310,200 
$ 842,000 
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19Xl 
22,095.700 
17,715,JOO 
2,291.500 
911 '600 )44,900 
_ _?60,800 
$ 571,600 
1.) All financial statements are audited with an unqualified 
auditorJs opinion 
2.) There are no unsatisfied judgements or legal suits pending 
J.) Inventories are valued under the LIFO cost flow assumption. 
4.) Fixed assets are depreciated under the straight line method. 
S.) The Company follows the successful efforts method of accounting 
for exploration and development costs. 
Summary of Financial Ratios 
for the Two -Firms 
Industry Brown White 
Average Oil Go. Oil Co. 
Ratio 19X2 19Xl 19X2 19Xl 
Return on Total Assets .062 
.057 .047 .046 .OJ6 
Current Ratio 1.51 1.32 1.29 1.32 1.30 
Quick Ratio 
.96 .77 .80 • 78 .804 
Current Assets to Total Assets .)6 .)5 .40 .32 .J7 
Sales to Net Working Capital 17.46 17.42 16.61 17.50 16.40 
Total Debt to Stockholders' Equity 1.20 1.26 1.26 1.52 1.56 
Return on Stockholders' Equity .1)2 .128 .1 08 .117 .092 
Interest Coverage 9.37 4.87 4.47 J. 71 J .19 
'l'he Black Oil Company 
Statement of Financial Position 
Fiscal Year End 
Assets 
·current Assets 
Cash 
Marketable Securities 
Accounts Receivable 
Inventories(at cost) 
Total Current Assets 
Plant & Equipment 
Total Assets 
. Liabilities 
Current Liabilities 
Notes Payable 
Accounts Payable & Accrued Liabilities 
Current Maturities on Long-Term Debt 
Total Current Liabilities 
Long-Term Debt 
Deferred Credits 
Deferred 'l'axes 
Stockholder's Equity 
Corr~on Stockholder's Equity 
Retained Earnings 
Total Stockholder's Equity 
Total Liabilities & Stockholder's Equity 
19X2 
220,600 
539.900 
2,150,600 
1,BP,too 4,7 2, 00 
!J.,5J4,900 
$).8,)1?,500 
381,200 
2,614,000 
JO].tl.QO 
J,298,JOO 
5,6JJ.900 
576,500 
J,015,600 
.5.79},200 
8,808,800 
$lJh.l12 ( 500 
76 
19Xl 
211, 6oo 
542,000 
2,092,600 
1,662,800 
4,512,000 
8 2 066 1100 
$!_?__L2?8,100 
)62,200 
2,267,000 
211 6oo 2,~8oo 
2,681,200 
5.54,000 
1,810,000 
4, 692,100 
6,502,100 
$1?,578,100 
Net Sales 
costs & Expenses 
The Black Oil Company 
Statement of Income 
Fiscal Ye.ar 
Cost of Product Sold 
Selling & General Expenses 
Depletion & Depreciation 
Taxes, other than income taxes 
Interest & Debt Expense 
Net Income 
Summary of Notes to the Statements 
19X2" 
1?,146,600 
12,828,800 
1,418,100 
810,000 
561,800 
426,800 
$ 1,101,100 
19X1 
14,085,400 
10,566,}00 
1,261,200 
651,500 
510,000 
186,600 
$ 909,800 
1.) All financial statements are audited wi.th an unqualified 
auditor's opinion. 
2.) There are no unsatisfied judgments or legal suits pending. 
).).Inventories ·are valued under the LIFO cost flow assumption. 
4.) Fixed assets are depreciated w1der the straight line method. 
5.) The Company follows the successful efforts method of accounting 
for exploration and development costs. 
6.) At the beginning of 19Xl the Cor!:lpany entered into several 
"throughput or deficiency" agreements with certain pipelines 
in which it has equity interests, These obligations require 
the corporation to provide specified miniruwn revenues from 
crude shipments for the next 10 years. At the end of the year 
the contingent liability had an upper limit of $1,950,000 over 
the remaining life of the agreement. Payments of $200,000 
(including $120,000 in interest equivalents) were made in both 
19Xl ~~d 19X2. The agreement provided financing for $1,500,000 
of pipeline equipment. 
It is anticipated that shipments or other operating factors 
will be at levels sufficient to provide substantially all of 
the revenues ··equlred. 
77 
The Blue Oil Company 
Statement of Financial Position 
Fiscal Year End 
Assets 
Current Assets 
Cash 
Marketable Securities 
Accounts Receivable 
Inventories(at cost) 
Total Current Assets 
Plant & Equipment 
Total Assets 
Liabilities 
Current Liabilities 
Notes Payable 
Accounts Payable & Accrued Liabilities 
Current Maturities on Long-Term Debt 
Total Current Liabilities 
Long-Term Debt-
Deferred Credits 
Deferred Taxes 
Stockholder's Equity 
Common Stockholder's Equity 
Retained Earnings 
Total Stockholder's Equity 
Total Liabilities & Stockholder's Equity 
19X2 
400,800 
67l.t. 900 
2,688,200 
2.JJ9,400 
'0,10).]00 
18,418,600 
$24,521,900 
476,500 
J,292,500 
4~8,900 
4,2 7,900 
8,?17,400 
720,600 
J,769,500 
z,o66,soo 
$24,521,900 
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19Xl 
389.500 
677.500 
2,615,700 
f, 082 ,J.Q_Q_ 
3.765,000 
11 1 220 1 000 
$l7_! ~J.2! 000 
452.700 
2,858.700 
t64, 2_00 ).75.906" 
5,126,500 
692,500 
2,262,500 
.2r22{r600 
~,040,100 
The Blue Oil Company 
Statement of Income 
Fiscal Year 
Net Sales 
Costs & Expenses 
Cost of Product Sold 
Selling & General Expenses 
Depletion & Depreciation 
Taxes, other than income taxes 
Interest & Debt Expense 
Net Income 
Summary of Notes to the Statements 
$ 
79 
19X2 19Xl 
21,4)),200 1?,606,800 
15.?86,000 12,957.900 
1,?72,600 1,576.500 
1,200,000 1,001,900 
702,200 637.500 
68J 1 ~00 J8J 1 200 
1,288,900 $ 1,049,800 
1.) All financial statements are audited with an unqualified 
auditor's opinion 
2.) There are no unsatisfied judgements or legal suits pending 
).) Inventories are valued under the LIFO cost flow assumption. 
4.) Fixed assets are depreciated under the straight line method. 
S.) The Company follows the successful efforts method of accounting 
£or exploration and development costs. 
Summary of Financial Ratios 
for the Two Firms 
Industry Black 
Average Oil Co. 
' Ratio 19X2 
Return on Total Assets .062 
.o6 
Current Ratio 1.51 1.45 
Quick Ratio 
.96 .88 
Current Assets to Total Assets • }6 
.26 
Sales to Net Working Capital 17.46 11.55 
Total Debt to Stockholders' Equity 1.20 1.08 
Return on Stockholders' Equity .1)2 
.125 
Interest Coverage 9.37 3.58 
19Xl 
.072 
1.59 
1.00 
.)6 
8.4) 
.94.3 
.14 
5.87 
Blue 
Oil co. 
19X2 19X1 
.05J .06 
1.4.3 1.57 
.89 1.00 
.25 .JJ 
11.55. 8.44 
1.26 1.18 
.119 .13 
2.89 3.74 
co 
0 
The Red Oil Company 
Statement of Financial Position 
Fiscal Year End 
Assets 
Current Assets 
Cash 
Marketable Securities 
Accounts Receivable 
Inventories(at cost) 
Total Current Assets 
Plant & Equipment 
Total Assets 
Liabilities 
Current Liabilities 
Notes Payable 
Accounts Payable & Accrued Liabilities 
Current Mat~rities on Long-Term Debt 
Total Current Liabilities 
Long-Term Debt 
Deferred Credits 
Deferred Taxes 
Stockholder's Equity 
Common Stockholder's Equity 
Retained Earnings 
Total Stockholder's Equity 
Total Liabilities & Stockholder's Equity 
19X2 
256,500 
4)1,900 
1,720,500 
L..!±_2_~__d 0 0 ),90 ,100 
11,78?,900 
$15!694,000 
305,000 
2,107,200 
~t.2Q_Q_ 
• 7 • 700 
5.579,100 
461,200 
2,412,400 
4,522,600 
~935;000 
$15,694,000 
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19Xl 
249.300 
4)J,600 
1,6?4,000 
W~H§t J' 9' 00 
1 1 5]2 1 800 
$U~22_,4oo 
289,700 
1,829,600 
~~ 2,]52, 00
3,281,000 
44),100 
1,448,000 
2,1i1-5,700 
$l.L_222 ,400 
The Red Oil Company 
Statement of Income 
Fiscal Year. 
Net Sales 
Costs & Expenses 
Cost of Product Sold 
Selling & General Expenses 
Depletion & Depreciation 
Taxes, other than income taxes 
Interest & Debt Expense 
Net Income 
Summary of Notes to the Statements 
$ 
19X2 
13,717,JOO 
10,10),000 
1,1)4,500 
768,000 
449,500 
4)7,400 
824,900 $ 
82 
19X1 
11,262,400 
8,293,100 
1,009,000 
641,200 
408,000 
245,200 
671.900 
1.) All financial statements are audited with an unqualified 
auditor's opinion 
2.) There are no unsatisfied judgements or legal suits pending 
J.) Inventories are valued under the LIFO cost flow ass~~ption. 
4.) Fixed assets are depreciated under the straight line method. 
5.) The Company follows the successful efforts method of accounting 
for exploration and development costs. 
Summary of Financial Ratios 
for the. Two Firms 
Industry Black 
Average Oil Co. 
Ratio 19X2 
Return on Total Assets .062 .06 
Current Ratio 1.51 1.45 
Quick Ratio 
.96 .88 
Current Assets to Total Assets .)6 .26 
Sales to Net Working Capital 17.46 11.55 
Total Debt to Stockholders' Equity 1.20 1.08 
Return on Stockholders' Equity .132 .125 
Interest Coverage 9.)7 3.58 
19Xl 
.072 
1.59 
1.00 
.)6 
8.4) 
.94J 
.14 
5.87 
Red 
Oil Co. 
19X2 19X1 
.053 .o6 
1.4) 1.57 
.89 1.00 
.25 .)) 
11.55 8.44 
1.26 1.18 
.119 .1) 
2.89 ).74 
co 
u 
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EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE 
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Questionnaire 
The two firms are applying for the following revolving credit 
lines (1 year term). 
The Brown Oil Company is applying for a $1,000,000 loan. 
The Green Oil Company is applying for a $1,250,000 loan. 
1.) What would be your initial interest recommendations on these 
arrangements? Express your responses as a percent of the prime 
interest rate. 
My interest rate recommendations, as a percent of the prime 
rate, are1 (a response of 100%, means you think the prime rate 
is appropriate) 
for the Brown Oil Company 
for the Green Oil Company 
____ _,~% 
_____ _,% 
2.) If both firms were granted, and subsequently exercised the 
above loan arrangements, what do you believe the probability of 
technical default would be for each firm? Express your answer as 
a decimal between 0 and 1. 
I believe the probability of technical default for each firm is, 
The Brown Oil Company 
The Green Oil Company 
________ (between 0 and 1) 
_________ (between 0 and 1) 
J.) If you were constrained such that you could only accept one 
of the two loan applications above, which firm would you select? 
Place a check by the firm whose application you would accept. 
(please che~k only one firm) 
---- The Brown Oil Company 
______ The Green Oil Company 
4.) Assume that these are the only two loan applications in your 
files. Assume further that you would like to allocate X dollars 
among the two loan opportunities. What percent of the X dollars 
would you allocate to each firm? (Notet both allocations should 
add to 100%. also O% is an admissible response.) I would 
allocate, as a percentage of x. to each firm, 
The Brown Oil Company 
The Green Oil Company 
-----'% 
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Questionnaire 
The two firms are applying for the following revolving credit 
lines (1 year term). 
The Brown Oil Company is applying for a $1,000,000 loan. 
The White Oil Company is applying for a $800,000 loan. 
1.) What would be your initial interest recommendations on these 
arrangements? Express your responses as a percent of the prime 
interest rate. · 
My interest rate recommendations, as a percent of the prime 
rate, ares (a response of 100%, means you think the prime rate 
is appropriate) 
for the Brown Oil Company 
for the White Oil Company 
·---'% 
-------'% 
2.) If both firms were granted, and subsequently exercised the 
above loan arrangements, what do you believe the probability of 
technical default would be for each firm? Express your answer as 
a decimal between 0 and 1. 
I believe the·probability of technical default for each firm iss 
The Brown Oil Company 
-----
(between 0 and 1) 
The White Oil Company 
------
(between 0 and 1) 
).) If you were constrained such that you could only accept one 
of the two loan applications above, which firm would you select? 
Place a check by the firm whose application you would accept. 
(please check only one firm) 
______ The Brown Oil Company 
The White Oil Company 
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4.) Assume that these are the only two loan applications in your 
files. Assume further that you would like to allocate X dollars 
among the two loan opportunities. What percent of the X dollars 
would you allocate to each firm? (Note, both allocations should 
add to 100%, also O% is an admissible response.) r would 
allocate, as a percentage of X, to each firm~ 
The Brown Oil Company _ _,__ _ % 
The White Oil Company 
Questionnaire 
The two firms are applying for the following revolving credit 
lines (1 year term). 
The Black Oil Company is applying for a $ 800,000 loan. 
The Blue Oil Company is applying for a $1,000,000 loan. 
1.) What would be your initial interest recommendations on these 
arrangements? Express your responses as a percent of the prime 
interest rata. 
My interest rate recommendations, as a percent of the prime 
rate, arez (a response of lbO%, means you think the prime rate 
is appropriate) 
for the Black Oil Company 
for the Blue Oil Company 
____ __,% 
------'% 
2.) If both firms were granted. and subsequently exercised the 
above loan arrangements, what do you believe the probability of 
technical default would be for each firm? Express your answer as 
a decimal between 0 and 1. 
I believe the probability of technical default for each firm isa 
The Black Oil Company 
The Blue Oil Company 
_______ (between 0 and 1) 
_______ (between 0 and 1) 
J.) If you were constrained such that you could only accept one 
of the two loan applications above, which firm would you select? 
Place a check by the firm whose application you would accept. 
(please che9k only one firm) 
______ The Black Oil Company 
_____ The Blue Oil Company 
4.) Assume that these are the only two loan applications in your 
files. Assume further that you would like to allocate X dollars 
among the two loan opportunities. 'ilhat percent of the X dollars 
would you allocate to each firm? "(Notez both allocations should 
add to 100%. also O% is an admissible response.) I would 
allocate, as a percentage of X, to each firma 
The Black Oil Company 
The Blue Oil Company 
-----'% 
----J% 
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Questionnaire 
The two firms are applying for the following revolving credit 
lines (1 year term). 
The Black Oil Company is applying for a $800,000 loan. 
The Red Oil Company is applying for a ~40,000 loan. 
1.) What would be your initial interest recommendations on these 
arrangements? Express your responses as a percent of the prime 
interest rata. 
My interest rate recommendations, as a percent of the prime 
rate, are• (a response of 100%, means you think the prime rate 
is appropriate) 
for the Black Oil Company ____ __,% 
for the Red Oil Company ____ _,% 
2.) If both firms were granted, and subsequently exercised the 
above loan arrangements, what do you believe the probability of 
technical default would be for each firm? Express your answer as 
a decimal between 0 and 1. 
I believe the probability of technical default for each firm iss 
The Black Oil Company 
The Red Oil Company 
________ {between 0 and 1) 
________ {between 0 and 1) 
J.) If you were constrained such that you could only accept one 
of the two loan applications above, which firm would you select? 
Place a check by the firm whose application you would accept~ 
(please che~k only one firm) 
______ The Black Oil Company 
_____ The Red Oil Company 
4.) Assume that these are the only two loan applications in your 
files. Assume further that you would like to allocate X dollars 
among the two loan opportunities. \'/hat percent of the X dollars 
would you allocate to each firm? (Notez both allocations should 
add to 100%, also O% is an admissible response.) I would 
allocate, as a percentage of X, to each firms 
The Black Oil Company ____ % 
The Red Oil Company ---~~ 
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Post Experimental Questionnaire 
1,) How many years have you been making loan evaluations? 
----------- years 
2.) What additional data would yo~ have preferred in making your 
evaluations? 
).) Are you familiar with "throughput or deficiency" or any other 
"take or pay" types of arrangements? 
very familiar 
somewhat familiar 
not familiar 
------
4.) Are you familiar with advance production payments or any other 
"carved-out production payment" types of agreements? 
----------- very familiar 
somewhat familiar 
not familiar· 
------
5.) Have you evaluated or otherwise analyzed loan applications 
for oil related concerna? 
Yes No 
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APPI:!NDIX C 
PILOT STUDY RESULTS 
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A pilot study employing 56 senior level accounting stu-
dents was conducted. The instruments used in this pilot 
experiment ~ere similar1 although not identical, to the 
instruments provided in Appendix A. The students were 
required to make responses on matched pairs of financial 
statements toth as inotviduals and as members of three per-
son groups. The three dependent variables used in the anal-
ysls wer e1 
VAR 1: an interest rate assl9nnent 
VAR 2: a subjective assessment of the probability 
of technical default 
VAR 3: an allocation of an arbitrary fixed dcllar 
amount between the two hypothetical loa~ oppcrtu-
ni ties. 
Throughout the experiment the students ~ere requested to 
place themselves into the role of a loan officer, and to 
provide res,onses based upon their best perception of that 
role. The treatment variables fer the pilot study ~ere the 
different liability disclosures (footnote versus face), and 
an arbitrary size adjustment, used for disguising the strut-
larity between the matched pair financial statements. 
The data was arranged such that there was repeated 
responses across the two levels of the disclosure treatment 
for each level of the size treatRert. Therefore, a split 
plot ANOVA procedure was used to test for treatment effects. 
The analysis was conducted under the assumption that the 
size and disclosure effects are fixed and the subjects 
(blocks) are random. 
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As can be seen by Tables XX, XXI, XXII, XXIII, XXIV, 
and XXV (Appendix 0) the size effect was not significant for 
any variable under either individuals or groups. This is as 
expected. The arbitrary size adjustment does not affect the 
relative financial positions of the firms, just the absolute 
dollar amounts of the accounts. As such, the subjects 
should not have responded differently to statements con-
structed in this manner. 
The disclosure effect was significant for all three 
wariables under the individual phase of the experiment, but 
vas not significant under the group phase. This is a very 
interesting result. The individuals were inefficient 
information processors. They responded differently to 
aatched identical firms under different disclosure formats. 
Evidently, the method of disclosing a liability has a pro-
nounced effect on the assessment of risk by students. In 
contrast, these same students arranged into groups did not 
respond differently to the financial data of the matched 
firms. Apparently, efficiency is quickly achieved as the 
subjects are aggregated into small groups. Furthermore, the 
interaction effect between size and disclosure format was 
not significant for any of the variables at either aggrega-
tion level. 
Given these ANOVA results further testing appeared 
appropriate. Paired t tests were performed to test for the 
significance of the disclosure effect. The differences were 
defined as follows: 
13 
DIF 1= the dif terence between VlR 1 for the two 
foraat types 
DIF 2= the difference between VAR 2 for the two 
format types 
DIF 3= the difference between VlR 3 for tbe two 
format types 
The results in Table XXVI (Appendix D) support the ear-
lier findings. For all three dependent variables, the indi-
wtduals reacted differently to the two disclosure formats. 
Apparently, the individuals ignored the footnote information 
and relied instead upon the financial ratios. For all three 
variables, the firms including the footnote were rated as 
aore desirable then the firms incorporating the liability 
·into the face of the stateaents. In.the latter case the 
economic consequences of the financing arrangement were 
reflected in the financial ratios. 
The group results shown in Table XXVII (Appendix 0) 
support a priori expectations. The student groups were able 
to recognize tne implications of the footnote presentation 
of the liability. As such, there were no significant aver-
age differential responses between the two disclosure for-
aats for all three variables. 
The above results indicate that individuals display 
lnefficent processing behavior, while groups evidence effi-
cient processing behavior. Given this, is the efficiency of 
the groups significantly greater than that of the individu-
als? To answer tnis question the mean differences were com-
94 
pared between groups and individuals for all three varia-
bles. Two independent sample t test results, shown in Table 
XXVIII (Appendix D), indicated significant differences 
between the means for · OIF 2 and OIF 3, but not for DIF 1. 
In all cases tne homogeneity of variance assumption for the 
two saaples was not violated. The preponderance of evidence 
indicates the groups are not only efficient, but signifi-
cantly more so than are the individuals in processing 
accounting information. 
One could argue that the observed relative efficiency 
of the groups over the individuals could be influenced by 
the order of collecting the data. Suppose the group phase 
of the experiment was administered first. It could then be 
argued that the information learned through group discussion 
could be appli~d at the individual stage, thereby minimizing 
processing efficiency discrepencies between the individual 
and group phases. To test for such an effect the student 
experiment was designed such that approximately half of the 
subjects responded as groups first, while the remainder 
responded as individuals first. The m~in hypotheses were 
then tested for tne partitioned sets. Tables XXIX and XXX 
(Appendix 0) summarize the results. 
Recall that overall, the individuals were found to 
respond to the two disclosure formats differently. However, 
if the individuals first respond in a qroup this ineffici-
ency is reduced. In fact, paired t results do not approach 
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significance {indicating inefficiency) for the .. group first•• 
partition. In contrast, if the individuals respond first, 
before the group phase, then the inefficiencies occur. As 
before, the group responses (irregardless of the order of 
data presentation) were found not to be different across 
the two disclosure formats. 
The mean differences for the group phase and individual 
phase were compared within the same order class. Tables 
XXXI and XXXII (Appendix 0) provide the results of the anal-
ysis. When groups respond first, the means of the individ-
ual and the group phases were found not to be statistically 
different. However, a statistical difference did occur when 
the individuals responded first. Apparently, the individu-
als 9ained some benefit from participating in a group dis~ 
cussion before providing individual responses. Such a dis-
cussion greatly reduced the individual inefficiencies, and 
furthermore, reduced the discrepancy between the individual 
and group processing abilities. Such a benefit apparently 
did not accrue to the groups as a result of response order. 
The above results would seem to indicate that group 
efficiency over individuals is dependent upon the order of 
individual-group decision making in sequential tasks. 
APPENDIX 0 
TABLES 
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TABLE I 
A S!JMft!ARY OF THE INDIVIDUAL PROCESSING 
LITERATURE 
Author Date Report Dependent Subjects Findings 
Change Variable 
Bruns 1965 FIFO/LIFO managerial students no effect 
variables 
Dyckman 1964 FIFO/LIFO managerial students no effect 
variables 
Dyckman 1964 FIFO/LIFO price/share students differential 
effect 
Jensen 1966 FIFO/LIFO fund analysts differential 
St.Line/Acl. allocation effect 
Dyckman 1966 FIFO/LIFO purchase students differential 
price & managers effect 
Dyckman 1969 GPL/Conven- price analysts differential 
tional offering effect 
Barrett 197.1 equity/ price/ analysts no effect 
cost share 
Dopuch & 1973 FIFO/LIFO fund students mixed 
· Ronen allocation (see text) 
Mcintyre 1973 conventional price/ students no effect 
vs. current share 
cost stmnts. 
Ortman 1975 segment vs. price/ analysts differential 
no segment share effect 
disclosure 
Chang & 1977 change in subjective students no effect 
Birnberg cost stand- probability (see text) 
ard of control 
Abdel-khalik 1979 FIFO/LIFO see text students differential 
& Keller effect 
TABLE II 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON THE CO~HERCIAL 
l.OAN OfFICERS 
Average years of experience 13.2 yrs. 
Familiarity with "throughput and deficiency" agreements 
Very Familiar 
Somewhat Familiar 
Not Familiar 
Familiarity with advance production payments 
Very Familiar 
Somewhat Familiar 
Not Familiar 
Experience with oil related loans? 
Yes 
No 
36% 
60% 
O% 
50% 
50% 
57% 
43% 
9S 
Variable 
PRICE 
DEFAULT 
ALLOCATE 
Variable 
PRICE 
DEFAULT 
ALLOCATE 
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TABLE III 
A TEST OF HO(l) FOR IND1VIDUALS USING A 
PAIRED TEST 
Mean Standard t OSL 
Error (sign 
considered) 
-.964 1.)90 -0.69 .247 
-.019 .014 ·1.36 .092 
-.054 ,085 -0.6) .7J4 
TABLE 1\1 
A TEST OF HO(l) FOR GROUPS USING A 
PAIRED TEST 
Mean Standard t OSL 
Error (sign 
considered) 
-J.571 1.829 -1.95 .OJ6 
-0,009 .02J -0.41 .)44 
.108 .119 0.91 .19 
------ - - -------------
Variable 
PRICE 
DEFAULT 
ALLOCATE 
Variable 
PRICE 
DEFAULT 
ALLOCATE 
TABLE V 
A TEST OF HO(l) FOR INDIVIDUALS USING 
THE SIGN TES'I 
+ n OSL 
sign 
CQnsict~;r.~eQ 
12 4 16 .038 
12 6 18 .119 
9 16 25 .08 . 
TABLE VI 
A TEST OF HO(l) FOR GROUPS USING THE 
SIGN TEST 
+ n OSL 
sign 
100 
considereQ 
6 0 6 • 0156 
4 4 8 .6367 
3 10 13 .0461 
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TABLE VII 
A TEST OF HO(l) FOR INDIVIDUALS USING A 
BINOMIAL TEST 
CHOICE Frequency Proportion 
Firm with footnote 19 .68 
disclosure 
Firm with balance 9 .32 
sheet disclosure 
TABLE VIII 
A TEST OF HO(l) FOR GROUPS USING A 
BINOMIAL TEST 
CHOICE 
Firm with footnote 
disclosure 
Firm with balance 
sheet disclosure 
Frequency 
11 
3 
Proportion 
.79 
.22 
OSL 
sign 
considereo 
,03 
OSL 
sign 
cons ide reo 
.0287 
Variable 
PRICE 
DEFAULT 
ALLOCATE 
Variable 
PRICE 
DEFAULT 
ALLOCATE 
TABLE IX 
A TEST OF HO(l) USING A PAIRED TEST ON 
INDIVIDUAL ARSOLUTE 
DIFfERENCES 
A 
Mean 
J,464 
.048 
,JJ6 
Standard 
Error 
1.2)4 
,011 
.055 
TABLE X 
t 
2,81 
4.40 
6.06 
Tt:ST OF HO(l) USING A PAIRED 'fEST 
GROUP ABSOLUTE DIFfERENCES 
Mean Standard t 
Error 
3.571 1.83 1.95 
.045 ,019 2.34 
,JJ5 .08 4.19 
ON 
OSL 
,0092 
,0001 
.0001 
OSL 
.073 
.036 
,001 
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TABLE XII 
CO~PARISON TEST OF MEAN ABSOLUTE 
U IF FERENC ES IN TESTING 
H0(2) 
Variable N Mean t OSL 
sign 
considered 
Individual 28 3.464 
PRICE 
-.049 Group 14 3.571 .519 
Individual 28 0,048 
DEFAULT 0.045 .156 .438 Group 14 
Individual 28 0,336 
ALLOCATE 14 .494 Group 0.335 • 015 
Group First 
Group Second 
Group First 
Group Second 
TABLE XIII 
A TEST OF HO(l) USING A PAIRED TEST ON 
INDIVIDUAL DATA PARTITIONED BY 
RESPONSE ORDER 
Variable N Mean t 
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OSL 
sign 
con~idered 
PRICE 14 -0 • .571 -0.21 .42 
DEFAULT 14 0.007 .40 .653 
ALLOCATE 14 -0.166· -1.32 .896 
PRICE 14 -1•36 -2.46 • 014 
DEFAULT 14 -0.046 -2.59 .011 
ALLOCATE 14 .059 .53 .;30 
TABLE XIV 
A TEST OF HO(l) USING A PAIRED TEST ON 
GROUP DATA PARTITIONED EY 
RESPONSE ORDER 
Variable N Mean t OSL 
sign 
considered 
PRICE 7 -4.57 -1.31 .118 
DEFAULT 7 0.029 1.55 .66 
ALLOCATE 7 -0.113 -0.6.5 • 731 
PRICE 7 -2.57 -1.78 .063 
DEFAULT 7 -0.047 -1.25 .13 
ALLOCATE 7 0.329 2.66 .018 

Groups First 
Groups Second 
Groups First 
Groups Second 
TABLE X'tii 
A TEST OF HO(l) USING A PAIRED TEST ON 
THE ABSOLUTE VALUES OF A 
PARTITIONED DATA 
SET 
Individuals 
Variable N Mean t 
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OSL 
sign 
considered 
PRICE 14 5 • .571 2.41 ,0)1 
DEFAULT 14 ,044 2.82 .014 
ALLOCATE 14 .374 4.47 .0006 
PRICE 14 1 • 3 57 2.46 .028 
DEFAULT 14 ,05) J,JO .oo6 
ALLOCATE 14 .299 4,00 ,001 
Groups 
variable N Mean t OSL 
s~gn 
considered 
PRICE 7 4.571 1. 31 .236 
DEFAULT 7 .029 1.55 .172 
ALLOCATE 7 ,)41 3.06 ,023 
PRICE 7 2.571 1.78 .12.5 
DEFAULT 7 ,061 1.80 .12 
ALLOCATE 7 .329 2.66 .0)7 
Signed Pair 
t Test 
Sign Test 
Binomial Test 
Unsigned Pair 
t Test 
Signed Pair 
t Test-Groups 
First 
Absolute Value 
Pair t Test-
Groups First 
Signed Pair 
t Test-Groups 
Second 
Absolute Value 
Pair t Test-
Groups Second 
TABLE XVII 
A SUH~ARY OF THE RESULTS FOR HO(l) ON 
INDIVIDUALS 
PRICE DEFAULT CHOICE ALLOCATE 
NS s NA NS 
s NS NA s 
NA NA s NA 
s s NA s 
NS NS NA NS 
s s NA s 
s s NA NS 
s s NA s 
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Signed Pair 
t Test 
Sign Test 
Binomial Test 
Unsigned Pair 
t Test 
Signed Pair 
t Test-Groups 
First 
Absolute Value 
Pair t Test-
Groups First 
Signed Pair 
t Test-Groups 
Second 
Absolute Value 
Pair t Test-
Groups Second 
TABLE XVIII 
A SUM~ARY OF THE RESULTS FOR HO{l) ON 
GROUPS 
PRICE DEFAULT CHOICE ALLOCATE 
s NS NA NS 
s NS NA s 
NA NA s . NA 
s s NA s 
NS NS NA NS 
NS NS NA s 
s NS NA s 
NS NS NA s 
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TABLE XIX 
A SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS FOR H0(2) 
PRICE DEFAULT ALLOCATE 
Signed t NS NS NS 
Test 
Absolute Value NS NS NS 
t Test 
Signed t Test- NS NS NS 
Groups First 
Signed t Test- NS NS NS 
Groups Second 
Absolute Value NS NS NS 
t Test-Groups 
First 
Absolute Value NS NS NS 
t Test-Groups 
Second 
Source 
Between Subjects 
Size 
Size(Subj.) 
Within Subjects 
Disclosure 
Disc. x Size 
TABLE XX 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ~ESULTS ON 
INDIVIDUAL DATA FOR 
Sum of 
Squares 
VARl 
40797.99 
661,24 
D.F. 
1 
54 
1 
1 
Mean 
Square 
661.24 
743.27 
Disc. x Size(Subj.) 
40136.75 
13712.50 
2014.51 
.58 
11697.41 54 
2014.51 
.58 
216.62 
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F OSL 
• 89 • 35 
9.3 .003 
• 00 • 96 
Source 
Between Subjects 
Size 
Size(Subj.) 
Within Subjects 
Disclosure 
Disc. x Size 
TABLE XXI 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE RESULTS ON 
INDIVIDUAL DATA FOR 
Sum of 
Squares 
VAR2 
D.F. 
1 
54 
1 
1 
Mean 
Square 
.125 
.0689 
Disc. x Size(Subj.) 
3.845 
.125 
3.72 
1.201 
.224 
.oos 
.972 54 
.224 
.005· 
.018 
111 
F OSL 
1.81 .184 
12,45 .001 
.27 .608 
.Source 
Between Subjects 
Size 
Size(Subj.) 
Within Subjects 
Disclosure 
Disc. x Size 
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TABLE XXII 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE RESULiS ON 
INDIVIDUAL DATA FOR 
Sum of 
Squares 
0 
0 
5.451 
1.096 
,048 
VAR3 
D.F. 
Mean 
Square F OSL 
· This treatment is not 
interpretable under this 
design for VAR 3. 
1).74 .001 
.61 .44 
Disc. x Size(Subj.) 4.)07 
1 
1 
54 
1.096 
.048 
.08 
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TABLE XXIII 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE RESULTS ON GROUP 
DATA FOR VARl 
Sum of Mean 
Source Squares D.F. Square F OSL 
Between Subjects 88)6.87 
Size 330.62 1 330.62 .?0 .414 
Size(Subj.) 8506.25 18 4?2.57 
Within Subjects 3962.51 
Disclosure 82.37 1 82.)7 .)4 .57 
Disc. x Size 213.75 1 213.75 .87 .)64 
Disc. x Size(Subj.) 3666.)9 15 244.43 
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TABLE XXIV 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE RESULTS ON GROUP 
DATA FOR VAR2 
Sum of Mean 
Source Squares D.F. Square F OSL 
Between Subjects 1.036 
Size .H?l 1 .161 ).)2 .085 
Size(Subj.) .875 18 ,049 
Within Subjects .)54 
Disclosure .008 1 ,008 .35 .565 
Disc. x Size 0 1 0 0 .999 
Disc. X Size(Subj.) ,)46 15 ,02) 
ANALYSIS 
Source 
Between Subjects 
Size 
Size(Subj.) 
Within Subjects 
Disclosure 
Disc. x Size 
Disc. x Size(Subj.) 
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TABLE XXV 
OF VARIANCE RESULTS ON GRCUP 
DATA FOR VAR3 
Sum of 
Squares 
0 
0 
1.5J4 
.oo6 
.006 
1.522 
Mean 
D.F. Square F OSL 
This treatment is not inter-
pretable under this design 
for VAR ). 
1 
1 
15 
.oo6 
.oo6 
.1015 
• 06 • 805 
• 06 • 81 
Variable 
DIF 1 
DIF 2 
DIF 3 
Variable 
DIF 1 
DIF 2 
DIF 3 
TABLE XXVI 
INDIVIDUAL PAIRED RESULtS FOR CCMPARING 
TWO LIABILITY DISCLOSURE 
FORMATS 
N Mean t 
56 -7.768 -2.82 
56 -0.087 -J.45 
56 0.198 3.72 
TABLE XXVII 
GROUP PAIRED RESULTS FOR COMPARING TWO 
LIABILITY DISCLOSURE FOR~ATS 
N 
20 
20 
20 
Mean 
-1.75 
• 013 
-0.031 
t 
-0.37 
.29 
-0.32 
OSL 
.0067 
,0011 
.0005 
OSL 
.7165 
.7760 
.7524 
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Variable 
DIF 1 
DIF ,2 
DIF 3 
Group First 
TABLE XXVIII 
TEST Of MEAN DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GROUPS 
AND INDIVIDUALS 
N Mean t 
individuals 56 -7.768 
groups 20 -1 .1 7 5 -1.11 
individuals 56 -0.087 
groups 20 ,013 -2,0 
individuals 56 .198 
groups 20 -0.031 2.16 
'l' ABLE XXIX 
PAIRED RESULTS FOR INDIVIDUAL DATA 
PARTITIONED BY RESPONSE 
ORDER 
Variable N Mean t 
DIF 1 29 -3.793 -1.02 
DIF 2 29 -0.053 -1.56 
DIF 3 29 0,103 1.47 
DIF 1 27 -12.037 -2.99 
Group Seconc DIF 2 27 - 0,122 
-3.37 
DIF J 27 O,JO ).88 
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OSL 
.135 
.025 
,017 
OSL 
.)14 
.13 
.153 
.oo6 
.0024 
.0006 
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TABLE XXX 
PAIRED RESULTS FOR GROUP DATA 
PARTITIONED BY CRDER 
Variable N Mean t OSL 
DIF 1 10 
-2.5 -0.41 .694 
Group First DIF 2 10 -0.006 -0.10 .92 
DIF 3 10 -0.032 -0.)0 .77 
DIF 1 10 -1.00 -0.13 .90 
Group Second DIF 2 10 0.032 0.45 .67 
DIF J 10 -0.03 -0.18 .86 
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TABLE XXXII 
MEAN COMPARISON BETWEEN GROUPS AND 
INDIVIDUALS WHEN GROUPS 
RESPOND LAST 
Variable N Mean t OSL 
Individual 27 -12.04 
DIF 1 
Group 10 - 1.00 -1.37 .09 
Individual 27 - 0.122 
DIF 2 
Group 10 0.032 -2.09 .022 
Individual 27 0.30 
DIF 3 
Group 10 - 0.03 2.04 .025 
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